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Introduction 
 
The renewable electricity sector is one of the most promising markets in terms of long-
term sustainability, energy security, and environmental responsibility. Renewable energy 
technologies, such as photovoltaic solar panels and wind turbines, have opened the door to an 
almost inexhaustible source of natural energy. As fossil fuels become scarcer, it is imperative 
that countries begin to develop new ways to harness these sources of energy and improve 
efficiency of their everyday processes. In addition to its inexhaustibility, harvesting energy from 
renewable sources has far fewer negative impacts on the environment than conventional energy 
production. The health and productivity costs associated with global climate change are 
significant, causing many countries around the world to enact stricter environmental regulations 
and set dramatic emissions reduction goals for the near future. Renewable energy offers a 
solution for all these challenges and production must be encouraged in significant, but 
responsible ways. 
Unfortunately, renewable energy production currently represents a very small fraction of 
our total energy production. According to the International Energy Agency, the world relies on 
renewable energy sources for just 13.1% of its energy supply. Although this number is a result of 
significant increases over the past decade or so, it is still a far cry from the production necessary 
to reverse global climate change and ensure future energy security. To make matters worse, 
forecasts for future energy demand allude to increases across all consumption types, from 
residential to commercial and industrial. Although new sources of fuel have been found using 
methods such as hydraulic fracturing, the extraction of these fuels is extremely damaging to the 
environment and is, of course, still finite. 
	   5	  
The greatest barrier associated with the proliferation of renewable energy is its cost. Like 
most new technologies, the technology associated with renewable electricity faces very high 
research and development costs. This results in much higher initial construction costs for 
renewable energy installations, causing consumers to shy away despite the production cost per 
kilowatt hour being relatively low over the course of longer time horizons. In comparison, 
conventional energy technology has long benefited from economies of scale, leading to very low 
initial costs and well-established infrastructure. With customers intimidated by high costs, 
renewable energy technology is not receiving the capital necessary to speed up development and 
proliferation rates. This is a major issue that some countries have begun to address through 
intervention in the market.  
The challenge of high technological costs is compounded by a variety of market failures 
within the energy industry, as well as by stubborn social norms that downplay the gravity of 
environmental issues. The most significant market failure is the unaccounted cost of negative 
externalities caused by conventional energy production. A recent study conducted by the 
National Research Council concluded that the production of electricity using fossil fuels causes 
upwards of $63 billion dollars in environmental and health damages per year (NRC, 2010). This 
figure represents approximately $.036 in damages per kilowatt hour, a figure that, if internalized, 
would increase current electricity rates by 40-50%. Other market failures include unaccounted 
for national security expenditures, asymmetric information, and unregulated market power of 
leading firms, each of which involve a negative externality that, if internalized, would increase 
the price of conventional electricity by even more. 
Although more and more people are starting to believe in global climate change and its 
various causes and effects, many are still skeptical about the effectiveness of available 
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technology. This skepticism is reflected in consumer preferences, which take the form of low 
adoption rates in the renewable energy sector. Despite some consumers expressing a willingness 
to pay a premium for environmentally-friendly products, including renewable electricity, other 
factors such as perceived inconvenience and unreliability severely hinder actual implementation. 
The most significant cause of these psychological biases is the lack of appropriate information, 
both on climate change and its possible solutions. To be fair, climate change is an extremely 
complex process that has yet to be fully understood, even by the experts. Therefore, it is even 
more important that information is consumer-friendly and relevant to the major concerns of those 
that remain unconvinced.  
There is no doubt that renewable electricity will need to play a major role in our future 
energy production, therefore it is imperative to encourage its growth and development now. 
Many countries around the world, and a few states here in the US, have already enacted policies 
to encourage the proliferation of renewable electricity. The most popular policies have been 
based on traditional subsidy mechanisms, in which the developing technological sector is 
protected from the competitive nature of existing substitute products. This protection incentivizes 
entry into the sector, accelerating development and increasing competition.  
A subsidy can be financed several different ways, each having a different effect on the 
greater market. One subsidy in particular, called a feed-in tariff, has been implemented with 
some success in Europe and the United States, as evidenced by increases in renewable electricity 
capacity without major market implications. A feed-in tariff is a subsidy that is financed by the 
existing firms in a sector, in this case conventional energy utilities. These utilities are mandated 
to increase their renewable generation capacities by entering into contracts with independent, 
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renewable electricity generators. These contracts stipulate the long-term purchase of renewable 
electricity at a price determined by a variety of different market factors. 
Instead of targeting the initial construction costs of renewable electricity systems like 
some energy programs do, feed-in tariffs target the long run costs of producing renewable 
electricity. This improves stability in the renewable electricity market as well as increases the 
chance of turning a profit in the long run, which subsequently encourages investment in the 
sector. The feed-in tariff is decreased over the length of the contract to parallel the decreasing 
costs in technology, and to encourage honest development towards cheaper and more efficient 
products. Ideally, feed-in tariffs will phase out as the once-new technology can compete on its 
own with traditional technology.  
This paper will examine the theoretical framework of a feed-in tariff before analyzing the 
political and economic characteristics of existing feed-in tariff systems adopted here in 
California and in Germany. Along with a set of policy criteria, proper analysis of existing market 
failures, barriers, and behavioral factors will be provided with concern to the proliferation of 
renewable resources. The goal of this paper is to provide policymakers with the information 
necessary in devising new incentive programs and to improve existing policies, specifically the 
feed-in tariff system. I will finally provide my own policy recommendations based on the criteria 
and analyses described above. 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. Chapter 1 will describe, in detail, the past 
and current energy production and consumption landscapes in the state of California. This 
chapter will also address forecasts for future consumption before outlining the major efficiency 
and environmental goals outlined in California policy. Chapter 2 will delve into the current status 
of renewable energy technology with respect to its environmental advantages and economic 
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challenges. This section will also examine some of the existing social norms and psychological 
biases surrounding environmentalism and the adoption of green technology. Chapter 3 will set up 
the necessary, theoretical framework for a renewable energy incentive program, specifically 
addressing the policy challenges and market effects of subsidies and feed-in tariffs. Chapter 4 
will then analyze existing feed-in tariff policies in California and Germany, comparing the 
effectiveness of each from a cost and capacity perspective using a set of established criteria. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 will consist of my analysis and policy recommendations for improving the 
feed-in tariff system here in California. These recommendations will hopefully have applicability 
outside of California for states looking to adopt or improve their own renewable energy policies. 
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Chapter 1: California’s Electricity Landscape 
 
California’s electricity production over the last half century has experienced a variety of 
trends in both supply and demand. These trends, including changes in state population, consumer 
preferences, technology, and natural resource markets, have affected pricing and consumption in 
dynamic ways. Consequently, these changes have had dramatic effects on the local and regional 
climate and environmental quality, spurring the need for comprehensive policy changes. It is 
important to analyze energy production and the environment together, as their relationship is 
strongly intertwined and will become even more so in the coming decades as the United States 
transitions to renewable energy. 
 
I. Electricity Production and Consumption: Past and Present 
California, like the rest of the nation and world, has produced the majority of its 
electricity using conventional technology and fossil fuels. Currently, natural gas fired plants 
account for 57.1% of all energy produced, followed by hydroelectric1 and nuclear at 17.5% and 
9.2%, respectively. Electricity produced from coal-fired plants is relatively low, accounting for a 
mere .8%. By comparison, coal-based power plants account for over 44% of the United States’ 
electricity production, while natural gas accounts for just 23% (Long, 2011). Although California 
has done well to limit the use of coal by using somewhat cleaner burning natural gas, both will 
have to be reduced and eventually replaced by renewable sources in order to achieve portfolio 
goals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities have yet to be fully understood. However, early studies show that land displacement 
caused by dams and reservoirs may cause significant greenhouse gas emissions due to the decay of submerged trees and other plants (Castaldi et 
al, 2003). Regardless, the focus of this paper is on prevailing renewable technologies surrounding wind and sunlight. 
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California’s electricity production ranks high within the United States in several 
categories. California ranks first in both net generation from renewable sources and geothermal 
generation. California also ranks high in the nation for conventional hydroelectric, placing third. 
Lastly, the state ranks tenth in the nation for electricity generation from nuclear plants (Smutny-
Jones, 2007). This diverse portfolio of production sources has served its consumers well, 
providing reliable power even during peak demand. However, emissions from the electricity 
sector account for nearly 25% of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, amounting to over three 
metric tons of greenhouse gas per person per year in California. Although steps are being taken 
to account for these emissions, power plants and utility companies have yet to truly internalize 
all of the costs. 
From a growth standpoint, California’s energy production has been on the upswing for 
many decades. According to the California Energy Commission, electricity production is up 67% 
since 1980, when production was approximately 170,000 GWh. Over the same period, 
California’s population has increased by only 59%, revealing a slight increase in per capita 
electricity production. Electricity generated from wind has experienced a growth rate of 178% 
over the last 15 years, leading all categories. Solar has seen similar success, growing by 30% 
over the same period. That being said, electricity generated from coal and natural gas has also 
experienced relatively large growth at 37% and 22%, respectively (CEC Online Database, 2012). 
Although growth in the renewable energy sectors looks impressive, electricity from these sources 
still represents a drop in the ocean compared to fossil fuel based generation. 
California is able to produce enough energy to meet approximately 70% of total demand; 
the remaining 30% must be imported from neighboring states to the North and East. This 
represents a fairly large production gap and will require serious attention in order to meet 
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statewide demand. Arizona and Oregon, both large electricity exporters to California, have 
experienced significant population growths over the past decade, limiting electricity surpluses 
and therefore their ability to provide California with extra power (Alvardo and Griffin, 2007). 
California’s population is still growing, albeit by a decreasing rate, so growth in electricity 
production will have to at least match this increasing demand. Efficiency regulations will 
certainly help in closing this production/consumption gap, but will by no means account for the 
full 30%. Therefore, California must expand use of renewable sources. 
Consumption 
Understanding the consumption landscape for electricity is also important for 
policymakers. Unlike production statistics, looking at electricity consumption reveals significant 
demographic characteristics that can be used to form demand-side programs and regulations. 
Consumption can be broken down in several different ways, particularly by sector, which may 
allow for more pointed renewable policies and efficiency standards. Also, remembering the 30% 
supply gap and subsequent importation of electricity, the type of energy that ends up being 
consumed in California does not necessarily parallel the source percentages of in-state 
production. This is an important distinction and one that must be considered when creating 
effective climate policy. 
California energy consumption was last reported in 2011 at 284,953 GWh, according to 
the California Energy Commission. This consumption has been on a steady incline since detailed 
reporting began in 1990, when total energy consumption amounted to 229,868 GWh. This 
represents a 23.9% increase in just two decades. California gross energy consumption falls 
behind only Texas, where electricity plays a major role in oil and gas extraction. Similar to 
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yearly consumption, peak demand2 has also increased, from 35,000MWh in 1980 to over 
65,000MWh today (Marshall and Gorin, 2007). Peak demand represents the highest point of 
demand during any given day and, as revealed by the statistics, is much more sensitive to 
population increases. This is a result of consumption trends along various sectors.  
When breaking consumption down by sector, we see that commercial and residential 
users far outweigh the industrial and agricultural sectors. Together, the commercial and 
residential sectors account for approximately 218,000 GWh, or 76% of total consumption. Not 
only do these sectors already enjoy the largest pieces of the consumption pie, they are also 
experiencing steady increases in consumption. On the other hand, consumption in the remaining 
two sectors has remained fairly constant over the last few decades and is not forecasted to 
increase. With respect to the industrial sector, the static consumption rate can be attributed to a 
decrease in manufacturing as a percentage of California GDP. Similarly, agriculture only 
amounts to approximately 2% of California’s GDP, hardly making it a considerable electricity 
consumer. 
It is important to identify which sectors are energy intensive for a couple reasons. First, 
remembering California’s 30% supply gap, the introduction of new energy sources, i.e. 
renewable electricity, should be located near intensive users to minimize transaction costs. This 
makes a strong case for distributed electricity generation, an argument that will be made in more 
depth later in this paper. Another reason to identify top electricity consumers is to better target 
product efficiency standards. For example, commercial and residential buildings rely heavily on 
electricity for heating, cooling, and lighting, whereas the industrial and agricultural sectors rely 
on electricity for mostly mechanical processes. Consequently, efficiency standards should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Peak demand is a particularly difficult challenge for renewable energy, as peak supply must be consistent every day of the year. Conventional 
electricity can easily provide the load balancing necessary to meet demand at all hours of the day, including peak demand. This is a major 
challenge for the renewable energy sector and one that will hopefully be solved through technological advancement. 
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targeted at home and commercial appliances such as air conditioners, light bulbs, and other large 
appliances. Both of these reasons for consumer identification have significant environmental 
implications that will help achieve California’s future emission goals. 
From a per capita perspective, California again finds itself atop the national rankings for 
the right reasons. Per capita consumption in California over the last ten years has remained 
between 7,000-7,500 KWh/person/year. This is compared to a national average of nearly 12,000 
KWh, a number that has increase by nearly 40% over the last 30 years. California’s low per 
capita consumption is the result of strict building and home appliance efficiency standards (CEC 
Online Database). For example, California regulations demand that a standard home refrigerator 
cannot consume more than .1(refrigerator volume in feet)+2.04 KWh per day. The list of 
appliance regulations is exhaustive and incredibly precise, accounting for every possible 
variation in the type of appliance (CEC, 2010). Many states do not have as strict standards, or 
any standards at all, leading to higher per capita electricity consumption. 
Despite California’s progressive looking electricity production portfolio and per capita 
electricity consumption, their involvement in the national electricity market reveals some serious 
problems. Of the 30% of imported electricity, nearly 80% of was produced using coal-burning 
power plants, specifically from the Navajo Station in Arizona and the Four Corners installation 
on the Arizona-New Mexico border. This amounts to nearly 70,000 GW of electricity per year 
that is far from clean and would severely hamper California’s progressive reputation if produced 
in state. The remaining 20% of imported electricity is produced from nuclear plants in Arizona 
and hydroelectric plants in the Upper Northwest, leaving a remainder of 0% for truly renewable 
sources. This analysis of import consumption alone is enough to reveal that electricity 
	   14	  
consumption in California is not as green as its production, a trend that should be combatted by 
environmental and renewable energy policy. 
Electricity consumption in California paints a very different picture than production when 
evaluating the state’s progressive reputation. Unfortunately, consumption seems to be less 
environmentally friendly than California production, utilizing a larger percentage of fossil fuels, 
specifically coal. This is a result of demand outweighing supply, making it necessary to import a 
large percentage of its annual electricity consumption. If electricity demand continues to grow in 
states bordering California like it has over the past decade, importing electricity will become 
more expensive and less feasible. This may, however, be a blessing in disguise, as it will further 
encourage the proliferation of renewable electricity and its positive environmental externalities. 
Environmental policy must take into account demand-side trends, especially trends across sectors, 
in order to effectively reduce emissions. 
 
II. Electricity Demand: Forecast of the Future 
Forecasting future electricity demand is a challenging but necessary task when planning 
to improve a state’s electricity portfolio. The sheer number of variables that affect demand is 
exhausting, ranging from yearly temperature trends to changes in technology over time. Due to 
this high degree of uncertainty, it is necessary to calculate a bracket of future demand, including 
a low and high estimate depending on different factor outcomes. The high electricity demand 
case accounts for high economic and demographic growth along with relatively low electricity 
prices and low self-generation rates. Vice versa, the low demand case assumes low growth rates 
and strong participation in efficiency programs and self-generation. 
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The California Energy Commission predicts that electricity consumption will increase to 
over 320,000 GWH by 2016. However, the annual rate of consumption growth is forecasted to 
fall to 1.29% between 2008 and 2016, down from 1.98% between 2000 and 2008 (Marks, 2007). 
This decrease in growth rate is due to several factors. First, the recession in 2008 severely 
impacted California’s economic growth, dropping state GDP growth from 3.1% in 2006 to .4% 
by the end of 2008. This significant decrease will take years if not decades to reverse, causing 
California’s electricity consumption to also lag. Secondly, relatively mild weather between 2008 
and 2010 reduced electricity consumption associated with air conditioning and heating. Weather 
in recent years however, has proven more extreme and should be absorbed into the next round of 
forecasts, most likely pushing consumption upward. Lastly, California’s population growth has 
slowed to less than 1 percent a year, down from nearly 1.5% during the 1990s (Goodridge, 2007).  
The overall future trends in consumption are paralleled at the sector level, with net 
growth bolstered by significant increases in the residential and commercial areas over the 
coming decades (See Figure 1). Energy consumption in the industrial and agricultural sectors is 
forecasted to remain unchanged, staying at 42,500 and 20,000 GWh/year, respectively. On the 
other hand, commercial and residential energy consumption is expected to continue its increase 
through 2018. Here in 2012, the commercial and residential sectors consume 118,000 and 
100,000 GWh/year, respectively. These numbers are expected to increase to 122,000 and 
116,000 by 2018 (Marshall and Gorin, 2007). 
Along with estimates for a substantial increase in yearly net consumption, the California 
Energy Commission predicts that peak demand will also increase, although relatively modestly. 
The middle case of their forecast model predicts an increase of 8-9%, from approximately 
65,000MWh to over 70,000MWh by 2016. But again, the rate of growth is less than in previous 
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periods. Unlike yearly consumption, peak demand is affected by other mechanisms. This time, 
the CEC specifically cites household generation, specifically photovoltaic, as a key factor in the 
decline in peak demand growth. An increase in self-generation using PV is predicted to be the 
result of decreasing technology costs and increases in government programs. Programs that 
encourage household PV that are currently in place include the California Solar Initiative, New 
Solar Homes Partnership, and the Self-Generation Incentive Program. 
From a per capita perspective, the CEC predicts that energy consumption will plateau 
around 7600 KWh/year and begin to fall slightly over the next half decade. Self-generation will 
again play a large role in this trend, along with the continuing decline of California’s population 
growth (Metz et al, 2012). Another major factor that has yet to be discussed is the changing 
behavior of consumers. Individual preferences will most likely shift as environmental initiatives 
become more popular, consequently increasing demand for green products, including renewable 
electricity. This is an important demand-side factor and one that will be discussed later in this 
paper. 
Demand forecasts can be somewhat unreliable as they are strongly tied to trends that are 
difficult to predict. That being said, forecasts do provide valuable insight into demand growth 
under a variety of economic, demographic, and environmental circumstances. Forecasts also 
allude to the direction of emissions, which closely follow the trends in consumption. The 
environmental effects implied in these demand forecasts are certainly dire and must be addressed. 
Legislators should make a strong effort to understand both the methods and results of such 
forecasts when prescribing policies to encourage renewable electricity production and emissions 
reduction. 
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III. California Climate and Energy Policy: Goals of AB32 and Energy Implications  
The United States ranks second in the world in carbon dioxide emissions, releasing a total 
of 6.5 billion metric tons of CO2 per year. As the most prevalent greenhouse gas, CO2 is directly 
responsible for the increased levels of thermal radiation occurring in Earth’s atmosphere. 
California currently ranks 12th in the world among carbon emitters, above entire countries such 
as Brazil, Spain, France, and Australia (EPA, 2012). California’s annual emission of 450 
MMTCO2 accounts for approximately 6% of United States total emissions, again falling behind 
only Texas. Transportation and the industrial sector are by far the worst offenders, accounting for 
37.9% and 19.5%, respectively. Although in-state electricity generation only accounts for 
approximately 12.3% of carbon emissions, the electricity sector’s share of emissions jumps to 
23% with the addition of electricity imports (ARB, 2007) (See Figure 2). Legislators need to 
devise policies that effectively target both in-state and out-of-state generation. 
Although the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation is relatively cheap, pricing does 
not take into account the environmental externalities associated with their combustion. For 
instance, the coal industry is responsible for a variety of different environmental hazards, from 
the initial mining stage to the transportation and combustion stages. Along with a host of other 
toxic heavy metals, coal releases a large amount of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous 
oxide upon combustion (Epstein et al, 2011). Natural gas combustion, although much cleaner 
than coal combustion, emits methane gas. Methane emissions amount to less than .5% of United 
States carbon dioxide emissions, but account for approximately 10% of the greenhouse effect 
(US Department of Energy, 2009). Natural gas also requires substantial infrastructure in the form 
of piping that poses a significant land use challenge. It is these methods that new energy 
legislature aims to curtail in favor of environmental responsible energy production. 
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California’s environmental policy is complex and exhaustive, however most pieces of 
legislature are aimed at achieving one key goal—lowering greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (See Figure 3). In order to curb emissions, 
California legislators passed the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Assembly Bill 32). 
AB32 set a variety of emissions goals and supporting mechanisms across many offending sectors, 
including the electricity sector. First, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) mandated 
GHG emissions reporting for all large industrial plants, suppliers of transportations fuels, 
electricity providers, etc. In addition to this reporting, CARB also established a cap and trade 
system3 for GHG emissions, effectively incentivizing the reduction of emissions for offenders 
across all industries. AB32 also targets fuel consumption in the transportation and construction 
sectors by mandating efficiency standards for automobiles, passenger vehicles, households, and 
commercial spaces. Lastly, AB32 targets the electricity sector specifically by setting a portfolio 
goal of 33% renewable energy production by 2020 and approximately 67% by 2050 (CEC 2011). 
Plans to achieve this goal involve a variety of market-based solutions, particularly programs that 
improve the competitiveness of electricity produced by renewable sources through incentivizing 
adoption of green generation technology. Along with stricter renewable portfolio standards4, 
AB32 also aims to encourage “green” consumerism in the electricity sector by appealing to a 
variety of individual behaviors and community social norms. 
AB32 relies on four, overarching measures in order to reach the 2020 and 2050 emissions 
goals for the electricity sector. The first is aggressive efficiency regulation with regards to energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The cap and trade system serves as the backbone for reducing GHG emissions in California. Certificates for emissions are issued and traded 
among offending firms depending on their offsetting needs. The number of certificates is reduced over time to incentivize cleaner technology. 
While experts struggle to determine the actual cost of damages associated with GHG emissions, the cap and trade system is quickly forcing the 
largest offenders to internalize the costs using an auction-based system. Any policy encouraging renewable energy should cooperate with cap and 
trade mechanisms. 4	  Renewable portfolio standard simply refers to the overall percentage increase in renewable energy provided by utility companies. The goal of 
33% renewable electricity in California by 2020 represents an increase in the renewable portfolio standard. 
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consumption. Although this is a major staple for the reduction of emissions in the transportation 
sector with concern to liquid fuel, this also targets end-use electricity products such as home 
appliances, air conditioning, and light bulbs. The second measure is the overall electrification of 
California’s energy production. The more machines and automobiles that can run on electricity 
the better, as the use of electricity is far less emissions-heavy than conventional fuel, especially 
when produced using renewable sources. Next, AB32 aims to decarbonized electricity 
production while doubling supply. Sustainable technology is already available in the form of 
renewable source generation, but development must continue in order for these sources to 
become competitive. And lastly, when electrification is not a possibility, AB32 calls for other 
decarbonization methods for conventional energy production, specifically the use of nuclear 
technology as a substitute and carbon capture and storage (CCS) when the burning of fossil fuels 
is absolutely unavoidable.   
Although electrification and decarbonization already come hand in hand for some 
production methods, specifically nuclear and fossil fuel with CCS, there are other drawbacks that 
hinder their feasibility. First, nuclear production has been and continues to be unpopular in the 
public eye, especially after the Fukushima disaster following the Japanese tsunami in 2011. 
Nuclear production not only draws questions on safety, but also poses a particular challenge in 
nuclear waste disposal. Both of these externalities would have to be examined thoroughly before 
proposing new legislation. Energy production via fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage has 
been shown to be fairly carbon-neutral, with some technology able to sequester approximately 
80% of emissions. However, cost-effective technology is still not widely available. Not to 
mention, CCS requires a vast amount of underground carbon sinks and at the end of the day still 
relies on fossil fuels. These technologies may be sufficient options to offset some externalities 
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associated with traditional generation methods, but neither represents a long-term solution in 
their current forms. Therefore, we must look to improve renewable electricity technologies and 
methods. 
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Chapter 2: Renewable Energy Technology and Market Challenges 
 
With nuclear generation and carbon capture and storage still caught in technological and 
social approval limbo, renewable sources represent the most feasible choice in long-term, 
environmentally responsible electricity production. Renewable electricity not only represents a 
low-emissions alternative to conventional sources, but also brings a host of other environmental 
benefits. These benefits include the reduction of water consumption, noise, waste, adverse land-
use, and thermal pollution. However, these benefits currently come at a premium. Technology 
associated with renewable electricity is fairly new and the research and development costs have 
proven significant. This presents the renewable electricity sector with some serious challenges 
within the greater electricity sector, where conventional technology enjoys a variety of economic 
advantages. 
Renewable energy production in California currently sits at 15.2% of total production, 
well above the national average of less than 5%. However, this percentage must be more than 
doubled to meet the energy portfolio mix demanded by AB32. Currently, geothermal5 energy 
accounts for 46.8% of all renewable energy produced, followed by wind (28%) and biomass 
(21.3%). Solar energy currently accounts for just 3.9% of all renewable energy production (Long, 
2011). This chapter will outline the environmental advantages offered by renewable electricity 
sources before going into the market challenges faced by these budding technologies.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Geothermal energy, although clean by conventional standards, is marred by other economic and environmental issues that put its long-term 
feasibility in question. First, geothermal water contains dissolved solids and gases that can be very toxic. Geothermal sites have also proven to be 
finite, with some of the older sites in California already experiencing a significant decrease in output. Therefore, geothermal energy does not offer 
the same long-term potential as other sources, particularly sunlight and wind. 
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I. Environmental Advantages 
As described in Chapter 1, conventional energy sources pose a variety of very serious 
environmental threats including air and water pollution, waste production, and adverse land use. 
These environmental impacts subsequently cause a wide range of health concerns including the 
increased risk of respiratory disease, heart disease, and lung cancer (World Health Organization, 
1999). Renewable energy sources effectively minimize all these negative effects, while also 
assisting in the reduction of existing pollution. 
The reduction of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions is undeniably the greatest 
triumph for renewable energy. Excluding biomass, which does result in some GHG emissions, 
renewable energy sources eliminate the emissions of several key gases including sulfur oxides, 
the main cause of acid rain; nitrogen oxides, which are responsible for the creation of ground-
level ozone; and carbon dioxide, the kingpin of global warming. Solar and wind are almost 
completely carbon neutral, only emitting harmful gases during the transportation and 
construction of their necessary infrastructure (Smutny, 2007). 
Renewable electricity sources also result in almost no waste production. Conventional 
sources, especially coal, result in millions of tons of waste associated with extraction of the 
necessary natural resource. For example, only a small percentage of a mined area is usable coal, 
the rest consists of unusable ore and shale that is left behind in giant piles referred to as “spoil 
tips” (Epstein et al, 2011). Not only does wind and solar energy production avoid the extraction 
externalities caused by fossil fuel sources, the materials used to construct solar panels and wind 
turbines can be successfully recycled.  
Lastly, the amount of land necessary for renewable electricity generation can be much 
less than conventional sources. Reducing land use is an important goal from an ecological 
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standpoint. Mining and the construction of pipelines for oil and natural gas have displaced many 
species and destroyed thousands of acres of natural habitats. On the other hand, wind turbines 
have been found to cause almost no issues for wildlife, including bird species, and their plot size 
is very small in comparison to conventional plants (The National Academy of Sciences, 2007). 
The land-use advantages are less clear-cut for solar panel installations, which undeniably 
increase in cost-effectiveness as their size increases. That being said, distributed, rooftop solar 
panel installations may be the future, in which land displacement would be almost negligible. 
Technological advancement of photovoltaic solar panels should see this as a priority moving 
forward. 
The environmental drawbacks for renewable electricity production are few and far 
between. Most negative environmental impacts are incurred during the initial stages of 
construction, as construction machines and vehicles are still powered almost exclusively by 
fossil fuels. As technology improves, even these small environmental detractors will cease to 
exist, leaving a process that is carbon neutral from day one. In terms of land use, although large-
scale renewable installations do require fairly large plots of land, the acreage pales in comparison 
to land that is irreversibly damaged by mining. If the value of these positive environmental 
externalities was monetized, renewable energy would quickly become much more competitive in 
the energy sector. Although the California cap and trade system is starting to account for 
environmental hazards, the playing field is still tipped in favor of conventional energy. 
 
II. Market Failures and Barriers to Entry  
Proper examination of market failures and barriers for renewable energy is the most 
important aspect of effective policymaking. Market failures exist on both the supply and demand 
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side of the electricity sector. Failures arise due to less-than-rational decision-making on the part 
of the firm and on the part of the consumer. Poor decision-making exhibited by the firm leads to 
market failures, while irrationality on the behalf of the consumer is identified as a behavioral 
failure. On the other hand, market barriers are defined as any disincentive to adopt the 
technology. Policies will have to design mechanisms that properly mitigate all three of these 
issues in order to truly encourage renewable energy proliferation. 
Despite their value in terms of sustainability and emissions, renewable sources remain 
uncompetitive in the greater electricity market without the assistance of government programs 
and subsidies. For example, the cost of 1KWh of electricity produced by solar is approximately 
$.22, compared to approximately $.04/KWh for coal (See Figure 4). If the price of electricity 
generated from conventional sources appropriately internalized the cost of the negative 
externalities associated with production this price disparity would be much less (Allcott, 
Mullainathan, Taubinsky, 2012). However, these environmental externalities are not accounted 
for, causing the largest market failure in the electricity sector. This externalities market failure is 
then accompanied by failures associated with national security and asymmetric information. 
The environmental externality market failure might seem like a rather obvious issue, but 
the challenge lies in quantifying the environmental impacts. Actions that affect ecological and 
biological processes are difficult to assess because the impacts are difficult to attribute to the 
source. For example, should the increase in healthcare costs associated with asthma caused by 
poor air quality be attributed to harmful emissions from automobiles, power plants, or heavy 
industry? In addition to this confusion, researchers have a difficult time quantifying the monetary 
cost of damage caused by emissions. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on 
Economic Advisors have examined the cost of damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions and 
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concluded with results ranging from $5.50-72 per ton of CO2. Other studies conducted by 
independent analysis groups have resulted in much higher damage costs, some totaling over $800 
per ton of CO2. Although the emissions cap and trade system has begun to account for these 
externalities, they still represent a major market failure in the electricity sector. 
National security also creates major inefficiency in the energy market that is often 
overlooked. Oil and natural gas reserves are very geographical concentrated, falling in a 
relatively small number of countries, of which the majority are politically unstable. The United 
States spends a significant amount of money to ensure the security of these reserves and the 
steady stream of supply back to the US. This expenditure is again an unaccounted for externality 
of the conventional energy market. Renewable energy does not require any such security, yet its 
price does not reflect this convenience (Owen, 2004). Or rather, the price of conventional energy 
does not reflect this security inconvenience. Consequently, renewable energy is again under-used.  
Lastly, the general lack of information concerning all the aforementioned externalities 
and market failures keeps the public uninformed of the advantages of renewable sources. 
Because renewable electricity is a relatively new industry, there have been relatively few 
comprehensive studies conducted. It is difficult to assess the success of the industry or its 
comparative advantages over conventional energy when data collection has been limited to a 
handful of years. Information will increase over time, but the current lack of information is 
affecting behavioral factors that will be difficult to reverse, a challenge that will be analyzed 
shortly.  
In addition to market failures are inherent disadvantages associated with renewable 
technologies and their associated resources. The most significant intrinsic disadvantage faced by 
renewable electricity is its high variability (Poortinga, Steg, Vlek, 2002). That is to say, 
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renewable technology is, and will always be, at the mercy of Mother Nature. There are hopes to 
mitigate variability in the future by improving energy storage technology for renewable 
electricity, but it remains a major flaw until then. As long as this disadvantage persists, investors 
will be faced with some added risk, a serious detractor when encouraging capital flows into the 
industry.  
Increased variability leads to a second intrinsic disadvantage in an unreliable load-
balancing schedule. Using conventional sources, utility firms can produce power exactly when it 
is most needed, specifically during peak demand hours in the late afternoon when air 
conditioning and appliances are being utilized. Renewable sources don’t necessarily follow the 
load trends during a given day and the technology necessary to store such electricity for later 
deployment has yet to be perfected. This poses a serious challenge for utility companies, who 
must be able to supply enough electricity at all hours of the day. California residents may recall 
the electricity crisis of 2001 that resulted in massive rolling blackouts and lead to the bankruptcy 
of Pacific Gas and Electric and the near-bankruptcy of Southern California Edison (Goyette, 
2011). Although this shortage in supply was the result of external factors, this crisis exemplifies 
the pressure under which utility companies are to meet demand. These issues of uncertainty 
posed by renewable electricity represent long-term and even permanent challenges. 
Lastly, the most significant barrier to entry in the renewable energy market is simply the 
high technological cost (See Figure 4). The technology associated with each renewable source is 
relatively new and therefore expensive. Learning-by-doing and economies of scale will help 
reduce the cost, but at the expense of time (See Figure 5). Learning-by-doing refers to the 
increase in productivity that comes naturally after repeating a process over and over again, i.e. 
the more solar panels a construction worker installs, the better he gets at it. On the other hand, 
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economies of scale refer to the increase of productivity that comes with expansion, i.e. larger 
solar installations are more cost-effective than smaller installations because the fixed costs are 
divided by a larger amount of panels. As technology develops and installation methods are 
perfected, renewable sources will certainly become more economically viable (Beck, Martinot, 
2004). However, this growth must be actively incentivized now in order to ensure its cost-
effectiveness in the future when resources for conventional energy run scarce. 
The market failures, inherent disadvantages, and entry barriers that currently exist in the 
renewable electricity market pose significant challenges for the growth of the industry. Some of 
these issues are being addressed by current policies; others will slowly fade as conventional 
resources become more scarce and unsustainable. However, the speed at which these issues are 
addressed is a problem in and of itself and must be expedited by further policy and more 
stringent regulation. To make matters worse, many of these failures and disadvantages are 
compounded by behavioral factors. Consumers, like firms, often do not behave in the rational 
manner that theory suggests. It is important to analyze these behavioral factors and their effect on 
the growth and implementation of renewable technologies.   
 
III. Behavioral and Social Challenges 
Another significant challenge associated with moving California towards a greener future 
is encouraging the necessary shift in public opinion. Any given program may in fact introduce 
the appropriate mechanism to drive the production of renewable electricity, but it must be framed 
in a way that captures the positive behaviors of the average consumer and attracts their 
participation. “Green” consumerism has certainly improved over the last decade as people 
continue to demand cars with better gas mileage and water bottles with thinner plastic. However, 
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the reasons for this increase in demand are sometimes misguided. For many consumers, better 
gas mileage is simply a way to alleviate pain at the pump, rather than a means to reduce 
emissions and curb global climate change (Litvine, Wustenhagen, 2011). The effects of many 
incentive programs, particularly subsidies such as the feed-in tariff, and the adoption of 
renewable electricity are much less cut-and-dry, making it even more difficult to encourage 
adoption. A successful policy concerning renewable energy should not only appeal to consumers’ 
wallet, but also to their conscience. 
The adoption of innovative products, including green electricity, can be framed in five 
steps. These steps concern cognitive and behavioral factors and how they affect an individual’s 
decision to participate in a pro-environmental behavior or not (Diaz-Rainey, Ashton, 2010). Step 
one is the gathering of knowledge on an environmental issue and the innovative technology that 
is supposed to address it, or rather the general improvement of environmental awareness. Step 
two is the formation of an attitude towards the technology. Step three is the resulting decision to 
either accept or reject the technology. And lastly, step four and five concern the actual 
implementation of the technology and the confirmation of its effectiveness. Successful policy 
should guide the consumer through these steps to ensure the greatest chance of actual 
implementation and the subsequent establishment of strong social norms in favor of 
environmentalism. 
Encouraging Awareness Before Action 
Green consumerism is only possible when consumers adopt a greater sense of 
environmental awareness. This awareness does not only stem from knowing an issue exists, but 
also from understanding the causes and effects behind its existence and the possible actions that 
might be taken to curtail its consequences. There are many factors that affect an individual’s 
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environmental awareness, some more influential than others. Researchers have explored the 
effects that knowledge and information have on improving this awareness. Studies have also 
proposed links to human rationality and moral obligations, both of which seem to be strong 
influencing factors. 
Environmental knowledge can be broken down into several different types, each with its 
own effect on an individual’s actions. The first and simplest form of environmental knowledge is 
factual knowledge, or the understanding of relevant definitions, mechanisms, and causes of 
environmental problems. After this comes procedural knowledge, which refers to the awareness 
of possible actions and behavioral factors associated with environmentalism (Tobler, 2011). 
Although both these forms of knowledge seem like significant factors in pro-environmental 
behavior, studies have shown that even this level of knowledge has moderate effects on actual 
participation. The pinnacle of these two types of knowledge is effectiveness knowledge, which 
refers to the understanding of the relative effectiveness of different actions seeking a certain 
outcome. This type of knowledge requires both factual and procedural knowledge, yet also is 
found to have a relatively weak relationship with pro-environmental behavior. Researchers 
surmise that this relationship is hindered by the difficulty to match knowledge across all three 
types. That is to say, an individual might be aware of the facts and solutions concerning a given 
issue, but not necessarily the effectiveness of the solutions. Feed-in tariffs will have to take into 
consideration all levels of knowledge, or lack thereof. 
In terms of climate change, studies show that the majority of the population knows 
relatively little about its causes and consequences. First and foremost, there seems to be general 
confusion surrounding the difference between weather and climate, with individuals often using 
the terms synonymously or even in the reverse. The confusion increases as the idea becomes 
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more specific, such as the facts surrounding ozone depletion or the role of greenhouse gases in 
climate change. Although consumers can be motivated without completely understanding the 
mechanisms behind global climate change, this does pose a significant challenge. 
Two other models have been developed in accordance to environmental awareness, one 
associated with rationality and the other morality. The first model concerns ecological behavior, 
or human’s inherent use of logic in decision-making. This model states that an individual will act 
pro-environmentally if the action is framed by incentives, such as monetary savings, and 
consequences, such as health costs associated with pollution (Osbaldiston, Schott, 2011). The 
only drawback to this model is that it is perhaps too optimistic of our ability to be rational. We 
often make decisions that go against the supporting evidence. The second model, called the 
value-belief-norm, comes from an ethical approach, examining morality and its effect on pro-
environmental behavior. Researchers point to our awareness of our effects on a fragile biosphere 
and the sense of responsibility that accompanies it. Intergenerational equity also plays a role, as 
humans tend to want to leave a better world for the next generation, namely their children. This 
model also falls a bit short in explaining environmentalism, as recent economic worries have 
eclipsed moral obligations under certain circumstances. 
It is clear that environmental awareness is achieved through a variety of different factors 
involving both knowledge and intrinsic cognitive functions, and that each individual will be 
differently affected by these factors. Consequently, pro-environmental behavior is the result of 
acting on any combination of information or emotional and social thought processes. Because 
there is such a wide variety of motivating factors across individuals, it is difficult to design a 
campaign that appeals to a majority of the population. Policymakers should make a point to 
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determine which factors have the most effect on the local population, especially for policies as 
specific as a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity.  
Attitude: Reversing Negative Perceptions and Framing Benefits 
Two of the most popular, and therefore most difficult to reverse, consumer perceptions 
towards renewable technology are that it is too expensive and that it is less functional than 
existing technology. The first perception is caused by the consumer’s failure to properly consider 
all the costs and benefits associated with renewable energy technology, specifically the social 
benefits. The second perception is due to a general lack of understanding stemming from the 
environmental awareness factors described above. In terms of framing a green product, such as 
photovoltaics, it is important to frame their value not only in terms of functionality, costs, and 
expected outcomes but also in terms of the consumer’s identity, image, and social norms within 
the greater community. 
The consumer’s failure to fully analyze the costs and benefits presented by renewable 
electricity, and the resulting perception that the technology is too expensive, is a result of his or 
her bounded rationality (Ozaki, 2009). Bounded rationality is a psychological theory that states 
that human’s decision-making abilities are hindered by limited information, limited cognitive 
abilities, and the finite amount of time they have to make any given decision. It is undeniable 
that the costs and benefits surrounding green energy are complex and sometimes difficult to 
discern altogether. Economic costs are difficult to determine due to the industry’s dynamic 
nature and the speed at which the market responds to fluctuations in demand for and supply of 
conventional electricity. On the other hand, the social costs and benefits of green electricity are 
even harder to quantify. The monetary costs of avoiding greenhouse gas emissions are a 
contentious subject, as are the health costs associated with poor air quality. The average 
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consumer does not have the ability to crunch all these numbers, often leading to inaction when 
faced with the decision to adopt green electricity. 
The second perception, belief that green technology is not as functional or reliable as 
conventional technology, is the result of our limited attention. Similar to bounded rationality, 
limited attention is our psychological tendency to lose interest in a subject over time and as the 
complexity of the subject increases. In addition to our inability to fully consider the costs and 
benefits of renewable technology, we tend to be intimidated by the sheer size of environmental 
issues and the complexity of the solutions that have been proposed (Masini, Menichetti, 2010). 
The Earth as a biosphere is as dynamic as it gets, involving ecological systems that take experts 
decades, if not centuries, to fully understand. It is no surprise that the average consumer often 
chooses to maintain his or her blissful ignorance.  
In terms of solutions and technological advancement, consumers perhaps find solace in 
the relative simplicity of existing methods and technology. The processes necessary in creating 
energy from fossil fuels are fairly straightforward—coal is burned, water is heated, steam turns 
turbine, television turns on. We tend to lose our attention when faced by the more technical 
explanation of photovoltaic solar systems for example, which rely on processes that are much 
less “physical” than those associated with fossil fuels. This xenophobia could be combatted if the 
benefits of renewable technology were better (i.e. more simply) framed. 
The perceived benefits of adopting green energy can be broken down into two categories: 
utilitarian and psychological. Utilitarian benefits are most closely associated with traditional 
decision-making; or rather the perception that a green product has additional benefits, and that if 
these benefits outweigh the cost premium of the product the consumer will adopt the technology. 
In the case of renewable energy technologies, many consumers rightly believe that green energy 
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decelerates climate change and reduces pollution and energy dependency (although they don’t 
necessarily understand the science behind it). However, despite this positive outlook on 
renewable electricity, the negative perceptions described above outweigh the willingness to pay 
this premium. Another significant drawback is that utilitarian benefits of renewable energy are 
difficult to see on the individual level, as noticeable environmental results are really only 
achieved once there is collective participation. This factor is particularly difficult to overcome at 
the individual level no matter how a policy is framed, as it simply relies on the participation of a 
larger group.  
The psychological benefits are more tailored to the individual and include the “warm 
glow effect” and self-expression benefits. Unlike utilitarian benefits that are only realized after 
significant, community adoption of a green technology is achieved; warm glow effect is simply 
the individual’s psychological response to positively contributing to a common good. Some of 
this response can be attributed to altruism. However, the warm glow effect also suggests that 
some consumers are willing to buy a premium product not because of its environmentally 
positive impacts, but because it makes them feel better about themselves (Hartmann, Apaolaza-
Ibanez, 2012). This positive psychological response is seen in other pro-social behaviors, such as 
donating to charity and volunteering. Although it may be argued that pure altruism is more 
ethical, the results are the same, therefore good policy should target both. 
Self-expression benefits refer to an individual’s status projection within a group or 
community. Here, the satisfaction comes from signaling to community members by making 
decisions and taking actions that are deemed as positive by established social norms. Consumers 
make signaling purchases all the time, from sports cars to designer clothes. Renewable electricity 
generation is symbolic of the individual’s environmental awareness and sense of responsibility, 
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two desirable social norms. However, consumers make signaling purchases because they 
perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs. Although being responsible and environmentally 
aware might both be desirable, for many the costs are simply greater than the expected utility. 
Policies should aim at increasing this perception of utility in order to tip the scales in favor of 
adoption. 
Evoking these benefits is the key challenge for a successful campaign for green 
electricity proliferation. Establishing a positive attitude by reversing current perceptions will of 
course be difficult, due to behavioral factors such as limited attention and bounded rationality, 
but certainly not impossible. Policies should be able to address cost through technological 
advancement on the supply side while also improving consumer perception and willingness to 
pay. Policies should first target behavioral factors at the individual level, before pursuing the 
psychological benefits of being part of a larger participation group. However, increasing the 
perceived utility of renewable electricity is not enough, the adoption process itself must also be 
framed as a positive, or at least manageable, experience. 
Adoption and Implementation: Acting on Attitude 
Studies have found that consumers, even those that identify themselves as “green 
thinking,” often do not adopt new technology despite claiming a willingness to pay a premium 
for green products (Jacobsen, LaRiviere, 2012). This discrepancy is caused by the belief that the 
adoption process is too inconvenient. Although this is partly true, a fact that will be addressed 
later in this paper, this perception must be reversed to ensure participation when the adoption 
process is eventually streamlined. Even if the perception of inconvenience did not exist, many 
consumers admit that they are hesitant to be the first to adopt, and that they would be much more 
willing to take the plunge if the norm was already established. Renewable energy policy will 
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have to devise a scheme to induce the proverbial “snowball effect” in order to increase adoption 
of the technology.   
The current processes necessary in adopting renewable electricity technology are less 
than convenient. The application process, especially in the state of California, is time consuming, 
both to fill out the initial paperwork and for the paperwork to be correctly processed. Information 
is not readily available on either the specific eligibility requirements or the transition process 
itself. All of these issues are compounded by limited time, causing even the greenest consumer to 
abandon the adoption process. These inconveniences all chip away at the perceived benefit of 
adopting the technology. So even though a great deal of consumers say they would be willing to 
pay a premium for environmentally-friendly products, when actually faced with transition costs 
the adoption rate falls dramatically. 
The lack of strong, specific social norms also tends to hinder adoption rates for renewable 
technology. A qualitative study conducted by Ozaki found that, despite believing in the positive 
effects of renewable energy, consumers were often hesitant to be the first of their respective 
communities to adopt. Other studies examining social norms have found that fluid adoption does 
not take place until 10-25% of the local population has adopted the technology or product. For 
example, only .6% of California households have been equipped with photovoltaic systems, 
perhaps a reason for, and not just a result of, the stagnant adoption rate. When coupled with a 
perception of inconvenience, this hesitation can easily tip the scales against adopting the 
technology. Some programs, including those part of the California Solar Initiative, have been 
implemented to entice adopters in the short-term by offering upfront financing assistance on 
renewable installations. However, programs that target adoption through long-term assistance, 
such as a feed-in tariff, should be just as convincing if framed correctly.  
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Nowhere has technology adoption through social norms been so dramatic than the 
proliferation of online social media over the last decade. The adoption rate for media outlets such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ are significantly exponential, clearly exhibiting a 
quintessential snowball effect6. In fact, the effect is so strong that Google+ reached 10 million 
users in just 16 days, as it was strongly framed as superior to the industry leader, Facebook. 
Social media outlets become more valuable and productive the more users they receive. The 
same is true for renewable energy, as evidenced by the growing presence of utilitarian benefits as 
adoption increases. There is now a social stigma associated with those who do not participate in 
social media; successful energy policy should try to create a similar perception in regards to 
conventional electricity. 
Barriers to adoption create a very specific group of actual adopters, whose demographics 
might actually be a discouraging force for other consumers considering adoption. There are two 
large groups that remain after all the current barriers have been experienced: consumers with 
significant, expendable income and consumers who value pro-environmental behavior extremely 
high (Roper, 2003). The first group sees the economic cost of adoption as very small in 
comparison to their wealth and is, regrettably, fairly homogenous in terms of ethnicity. The 
second group, arguably an even smaller segment of the population than the first, views the 
benefits of pro-environmental behavior so highly that the premium is almost negligible. Both of 
these groups represent distinctive minorities, causing other segments of the population to feel 
alienated from the cause, and therefore made even less likely to adopt the technology. An 
effective policy should strive to encourage a diverse group of adopters to ensure that segments of 
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  The snowball effect is closely related to Metcalfe’s law, especially in regards to networks. Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a network is 
proportional to the square of the number of connected users. For example, two Facebook users can only make one connection, but 5 users can 
make 10 connections and 10 users can make 66 connections. Adopting renewable energy is not explicitly part of a network, but the adoption rates 
would parallel this idea with the establishment of strong social norms. 
	   37	  
the population are not disenfranchised by the formation of strong environmental norms in 
minority groups. 
Solidifying Social Norms 
Not only does solidifying a specific environmental social norm improve the adoption of 
that specific technology or habit, it improves the likelihood of other environmental practices 
becoming norms as well. Studies show that individuals who already have habits within an 
overarching ideology, such as environmentalism, are more likely to continue picking up habits 
that fall under that category than those who do not already exhibit any of those habits (Egmond, 
Jonkers, Kok, 2004). For example, consumers that purchase high efficiency light bulbs are 
probably more likely to adopt renewable electricity than consumers who don’t buy efficient light 
bulbs. 
Reaching the 10-25% threshold at which a social norm begins to take hold also has 
positive effects on technological advancement and, of course, the associated utilitarian benefits. 
In terms of renewable energy, a significant increase in adopters leads to a significant increase in 
demand and capital flowing into the market. As described in the economic section above, this 
influx increases competition within the renewables market and, subsequently, increases 
competition in the greater electricity sector. As discussed, utilitarian benefits can be a strong 
influence, but only if the benefits are relatively easy to discern. Reaching the social norm 
threshold would create a positive feedback loop, in which the utilitarian benefits would become 
more distinct, leading to an even greater number of adopters and further strengthening the norm.  
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Chapter 3: Criteria and Theoretical Framework for Successful Policy 
 
I. Distribution Type 
The first thing that must be considered in creating policy is the desired type of renewable 
energy infrastructure, distributed or utility-scale. Until recently, wind and solar installations have 
taken the form of very large, concentrated systems. These systems require large amounts of 
surface area, leading to their construction out in the deserts away from the more populated areas 
of California. These systems, despite taking advantage of the economies of scale associated with 
large installations, do pose economic challenges that reduce their feasibility. On the other hand, 
distributed rooftop systems tend to represent a more flexible installation option. And although 
the cost per KW is higher, distributed installations benefit from a variety of other economic and 
environmental aspects. 
First, large installations require a considerable amount of land. A newly proposed solar 
installation in the Mojave Desert is expected to cover nearly 4,000 acres. This will be the largest 
installation in California history and will have a capacity of approximately 550MW. That being 
said, several other large installations are currently being completed or have been proposed for the 
future, which will undoubtedly cause the displacement of thousands of more acres. Although 
these installations pose few threats in terms of pollution7, they do run the risk of disrupting 
ecology systems, including the destruction of habitat for species living in the area. Many 
desirable areas for renewable electricity installations also coincide with valuable agricultural 
land, which will more often than not take precedence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Large solar installations do require a fair amount of water in order to properly clean the panels. This cleaning process may introduce some 
contaminants into the water supply. However, very few studies have addressed this question so the effects are generally unknown. One can 
surmise that the amount of water pollution certainly depends on what cleaning chemicals are used in addition to water. Water requirements can 
also introduce maintenance costs to the project that vary depending on the location of the installation. 
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Large installations also decrease feasibility due to the added transportation costs. The 
Mojave Desert may be abundant in sunshine, wind, and land but it is geographically distant from 
demand. This added distance increases cost in two categories. First, the added distance 
significantly increases transportation costs for the necessary construction equipment. Apart from 
being costly, the transportation of the renewable technology is by far the most environmentally 
destructive aspect of the installation from an emissions standpoint. Secondly, increasing the 
distance between supply and demand poses several energy transfer challenges (Evans, 2011). 
Good connection to the grid is imperative to maximize efficiency and reliability, two key aspects 
that are already a challenge for renewable electricity. The physical infrastructure necessary to 
connect to the grid, including advanced transformers, additional power lines, and specialty 
meters, is expensive and often incurred by the utility company, further decreasing the incentives 
for investing in the renewable technology.  
Lastly, large renewable energy installations tend to run into more permitting and 
regulation issues than small, distributed systems. The lands on which these installations are 
generally built are often designated agricultural or protected wildlife lands. Changing the 
necessary zoning regulations can be time consuming and costly. In addition to zoning and 
general plan provisions, plans for large installations must also be wary of agricultural 
groundwater rights as well as cultural and visual regulations that might be in effect. Not only 
does abiding by these various regulations make planning more tedious, the necessary permits and 
associated paperwork can be costly and very time consuming.  
For example, several projects in the Mojave Desert where delayed for months due to 
legal battles activated by environmental groups and Native American tribes. The environmental 
groups asserted that the installations would irreversibly damage the ecology of the desert while 
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the Native American tribes sought to protect ancient cave paintings and other spiritual sites 
located in the area (Helmore, 2012). Installation developers fought back, claiming that losing 
even 1/10th of the necessary land would leave the project economical unviable, revealing how 
thin the profit margins are for even the largest of projects. Regulatory issues such as these run the 
risk of discouraging investors, especially if they persist over the course of months. 
In comparison, distributed renewable energy systems effectively combat all the 
aforementioned issues, while only facing a few challenges of their own. Distributed systems do 
not require nearly as much land, in fact, distributed systems usual occupy land that has already 
been developed, such as the case of rooftop solar panels. Small systems rarely displace land that 
would otherwise be used for a different purpose. Secondly, distributed systems are often located 
where demand is highest. Rooftop solar panels can provide energy for the house or commercial 
structure that it is built upon. If the energy is to be sold to a utility, small installations are more 
often than not located within the existing grid, reducing the cost of the energy transfer and the 
necessary infrastructure. Lastly, distributed systems have to jump through far fewer regulatory 
hoops than utility-scale operations. This is mostly the result of the land use advantage, but is also 
due to the fact that residential zoning already gives homeowners the right to take advantage of 
incident sunlight on their property. 
The only significant disadvantages to distributed renewable energy systems concern cost 
and ownership. As mentioned before, the cost per kilowatt of capacity is significantly higher for 
small-scaled installations, as they fail to take advantage of economies of scale. The actual 
installation of the panels represents a large portion of the initial cost, which fails to be displaced 
because of the project’s small size. In the long run however, as the construction costs are 
absorbed, per KWh cost begins to align with large-scale production costs. Utilities are also less 
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likely to invest in distributed production because ownership remains in the hands of the 
household or commercial business. Large-scale installations are owned and controlled by utilities, 
ensuring that any decisions made are made to benefit the utility firm. Although both of these 
issues fall in the favor of utility-scaled installations, the overall benefits of distributed systems 
seems to take the upper hand.     
Distributed renewable energy systems effectively avoid the economic and political issues 
faced by utility-scale installations. Although distributed systems have a few drawbacks of their 
own, they certainly represent the future of renewable energy production as land becomes scarcer 
and technological costs decrease. This is not to say that doing away with plans for large-scale 
systems is also the correct response, as diversity of generation is a valuable characteristic of a 
stable and reliable electricity grid. However, the time and space necessary for constructing large-
scale projects simply do not coincide with the goals set forth by AB32. Existing utility-scaled 
projects contribute a significant amount of renewable energy, but the remaining supply gap must 
be filled primarily by distributed sources. 
 
II. Policy Criteria for Encouraging Distributed Renewable Energy 
When addressing existing policies or devising new policies, it is important to approach the 
problem using a consistent lens. Using explicit criteria is especially useful when dealing with 
complex issues, a category that renewable electricity growth certainly falls under. Criteria allow 
decision makers to discern key differences between policies, particularly by highlighting each 
policy’s respective benefits and disadvantages. There are an infinite number of ways to devise 
policy that encourages the production of renewable energy; therefore the appropriate set of 
criteria must also be extensive.  
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• First, the policy must be effective. Effectiveness can be measured by simply examining 
the increase in gross capacity of the renewable electricity technology. This measurement 
only concerns capacity and is blind to cost. Not only should a policy be effective, but it 
should also be effective in a responsible way. In other words, policies that are over 
effective can lead to unforeseen negative effects that may compromise the entire program. 
 
• Next, a policy should be cost-effective. This measurement concerns the overall cost of 
the policy divided by the capacity of the resulting technology. This criteria point is 
particularly good when comparing two policies side-by-side. Policymakers should be 
savvy to consider both monetary and social costs in this analysis. Although some social 
costs (or benefits) are difficult to quantify, as is often the case for environmental products, 
they can often be the most significant aspect of a project.  	  
• Successful policy should consider both short-term and long-term assistance. Depending 
on the size of the project and the type of producer, policies should cater to their most 
pressing financial needs, whether they be the upfront costs of installation or the cost of 
production over time. 	  
• Renewable energy policy should mitigate uncertainty in the market. Incentive programs 
should create a stable investment atmosphere that fosters significant, financial 
involvement. Just as in any other market, prospective investors are deterred by risk. The 
more certainty a program can promote, the better. In addition, policy should ensure that 
existing firms in the sector, specifically investor-owned utilities, are not unfairly 
burdened by any remaining risk. 	  
• Another important market characteristic that policies should strive for is efficiency. 
Policies should aim to minimize transaction and other processing costs in order to 
streamline adoption. Transaction costs may include administration fees, permit fees, or 
the actual infrastructural costs of adopting renewable energy. Minimizing these costs also 
ensures that a greater percentage of investment funds go directly to development and 
technological research. Efficiency can also refer to the proper accounting of any 
externalities associated with the electricity sector, both from conventional and renewable 
sources. 	  
• Next, policy goals and mechanisms should be transparent. Although mechanisms might 
be fairly complex, information must be available for those who demand it. All costs must 
be accounted for and available to the public. Transparency is also important in terms of 
behavioral factors. Improving access to reliable information will hopefully convince 
those who may be on the fence in their adoption decision. 
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• A long-term criteria goal for renewable energy involves market conformity. Market 
conformity is the creation of a mature, stable, and competitive market. Policies assisting 
the proliferation of renewable energy, even long-term policies, must have a well-thought-
out exit strategy that leaves renewable electricity producers able to compete on their own 
with conventional sources. 
 
• Another persistent criteria point is the continual incentivizing of technological 
development. Policies should not only encourage pure capacity growth, but also 
continuous development toward more efficient and lower-cost technology. Technological 
advancement will greatly increase the chances for market conformity as programs expire. 
 
• Lastly, policies must be cognizant of behavioral factors and social norms. Understanding 
these factors will assist in creating a policy that has significant consumer appeal. 
Consumer behavior can be targeted in two ways: information availability and framing. 
For many consumers, simply being educated on the problem and the proposed solution is 
enough to win them over. For those that need further convincing, framing information in 
a way that appeals to certain behavioral factors can be very effective. 	  
This set of criteria encompasses the most important characteristics of a successful renewable 
energy policy. It is with this lens that I will evaluate the qualities of a feed-in tariff system. 
However, before delving into policies in the real world, it is important to understand their 
theoretical properties.  
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
In order to create successful policy, decision-makers must consider the market failures 
and behavioral factors outlined in the previous chapter, as well as the costs and benefits of a 
distributed system. Although the ideal, theoretical policy will not be perfectly applicable in the 
real world, it is an appropriate place to start in order to understand some of the underlying 
economic mechanisms that exist in the market. As a fledgling industry, the renewable electricity 
sector must be protected from the competitive nature of the greater energy sector. The two most 
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popular policy options are a subsidy and a tariff. A subsidy is assistance paid to a business or 
industry by the government or other supporting body in order to prevent the decline or closure of 
the business due to persisting unprofitable operations. A tariff on the other hand, is a tax or duty 
employed on a certain industry or product, effectively lowering its competitiveness. Successful 
policy might include aspects of both a subsidy and a tariff to achieve the desired outcome. 
The key goal of a subsidy is to lower the price of the product for consumers while raising 
the price received by producers. Traditional subsidies are typically financed by the government 
through taxes. The subsidy effectively shifts the supply curve to the right, increasing supply and 
lowering the price experienced by consumers. The producer then receives the price paid by 
consumers plus the subsidy, resulting in a price that is higher than the previous free-market 
equilibrium (Batlle, 2011). The gains by the consumer and the producer depend on the slope of 
the supply and demand curves. Producers will tend to experience larger gains than consumers 
due to relatively inelastic demand (seen as a steep demand curve). Energy is a necessity good, 
meaning that changes in price will have little impact on demand in the short-term, the definition 
of inelasticity. However, demand in the long-term may be more sensitive to price. 
Several studies have been conducted to elicit the price elasticity of demand for electricity, 
most concluding that it depends on the responsiveness of the utility company. A survey of 
residential demand found price elasticities ranging from -1.25 to -2.57 (Lafferty, 2001). This 
fairly wide range is the result of time-of-day considerations, with elasticity at its lowest during 
peak demand hours. On the other hand, price elasticities found for commercial customers were 
much tighter and more inelastic, ranging from 0 to -.47. This is intuitive, considering the fairly 
consistent electrical needs of commercial buildings. Price elasticity depends strongly on the 
responsiveness of utility companies. Utilities that use a fixed price tend to see more inelastic 
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demand curves, while utilities that use dynamic pricing, such as hourly adjusting, experience 
more elastic demand curves. Here in California, most utilities provide dynamic pricing options. 
Although elasticity is still quite low, price changes should be kept within reason so as to avoid 
significant changes in demand and to ensure renewable electricity producers are well supported. 
This is especially important in the long run, as time allows consumers to substitute away from a 
good if they experience significant price increases. 
Although a subsidy undoubtedly benefits the receiving industry, it comes at a cost. The 
gains by both producers and consumers come at the cost of government expenditures. This 
number can be quite substantial depending on the size of the industry and how high the subsidy 
must be to effectively protect it. The renewable energy sector is a relatively large sector and only 
becoming more so. The subsidy necessary to protect renewable electricity, especially for solar 
technology, will also be significant. In addition to the high gross cost of a subsidy, the cost-
benefit ratio is not 1:1. That is to say, the costs are not perfectly offset by the benefits. A subsidy 
introduces a fair amount of deadweight loss, which refers to the difference between the total cost 
and the combined market gains of producers and consumers (Eichner, Runkel, 2010). 
Deadweight loss is almost unavoidable when market regulations are adopted, however they can 
be a deciding factor in the adoption of a subsidy and must be properly considered. 
In contrast to a subsidy, a tariff is aimed at reducing the competitiveness of a specific 
industry, in this case the conventional electricity sector. Opposite of a subsidy, a successful tariff 
increases the price paid by consumers while decreasing the price received by producers. The 
difference of these two prices is equal to the size of the tax. These prices are the result of a 
leftward shift of the supply curve, moving it upwards along the demand curve (Lesser, Su, 2007). 
This time, again due to the elasticity of demand, the brunt of the tax burden will fall on 
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consumers. Although demand is relatively inelastic, large price changes due to the tariff burden 
will affect demand. 
Instead of costing the government, a tariff increases revenue equal to the number of 
products sold multiplied by the size of the tax. This would be a significant amount of money 
considering the size of the conventional energy market. This added revenue could be used to 
invest in renewable energy programs or in other government obligations. However, as with a 
subsidy, a tariff still creates deadweight loss in the market. Politically, a tariff is difficult to gain 
support, as it is more or less a tax. On the other hand, a traditional subsidy, although not a tax 
itself, requires taxes for funding. Therefore, the issue lies in creating a policy that is as close to 
budget-neutral as possible. 
 
IV. The Feed-in Tariff: A Budget-Neutral Subsidy 
A feed-in tariff is best viewed as a combination of a subsidy and a tariff, in the sense that 
the subsidy is financed by the competitive industry instead of the government. In a feed-in tariff 
system, utilities are required by law to enter purchase agreements with renewable electricity 
generators. A feed-in tariff causes the supply of renewable electricity to shift right, just as a 
subsidy would, while at the same time causing a leftward shift in supply of conventional 
electricity, like a tariff (Rio, 2011). In theory, a feed-in tariff not only fosters technological 
development but also mitigates the risks associated with investing in the renewable sector. An 
ideal feed-in tariff also has a natural exit strategy, phasing out as the new technology becomes 
more competitive with conventional technology. Lastly, the utility companies bear the extra cost 
associated with renewable electricity production, effectively internalizing their negative 
externalities and financing the tariff without government funding.  
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Mitigating Risk 
In theory, a feed-in tariff effectively addresses the risks inherent in the renewable energy 
market described in Chapter 2, those being price, volume, and load balancing. Price is perhaps 
the most important risk factor to mitigate, as it has the most significant market implications. 
Feed-in tariffs employ long-term contracts, typically 20 years, which promise minimum per 
KWh payments to renewable electricity generators. These payments adjust annually according to 
predetermined degression rates. Price degression works within contracts as well as across 
contracts over time. Within a specific contract, the renewable energy producer agrees to a fixed, 
annual degression rate8 over the life of the contract. This rate is usually designed to maintain a 4-
5% return of investment each year. Across contracts, the starting tariff price is lower for newer 
contracts, as they presumably have access to technology that is better and more efficient than 
technology employed by earlier contracts. (Shrimali, Baker, 2012). Both the longevity of the 
contract and the fixed degression rates provide stability for prospective investors, allowing them 
to calculate precisely how much energy a project must produce in order to experience a profit. 
Secondly, feed-in tariffs do away with most all the risk concerning volume. Along with 
guaranteed pricing, feed-in tariff contracts also ensure that generators are compensated for any 
amount of electricity they wish to sell. Renewable electricity generators can enter contracts that 
stipulate the complete purchase of all energy produced by the installation. On the other hand, 
generators can also choose to sell only the surplus in electricity after their own power needs have 
been met. In the event of underperformance by a renewable electricity generator, a feed-in tariff 
can impose a penalty, allowing utilities to purchase renewable electricity elsewhere in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Fixed digression rates are typically based on technological development forecasts and demand forecasts based on conventional electricity. 
Although fixed rates do mitigate risk for those entering contracts, they do run the risk of being incorrect due to poor forecasting or unforeseen 
circumstances in the market. If the degression rate turns out to be too low, the renewable energy producer reaps the benefit and vice versa. 
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meet their renewable portfolio standards (California Energy Commission, 2010). These contracts 
provide certainty for both the renewable electricity producer and the utility company. 
Lastly, feed-in tariffs can eliminate the risk of load imbalances for investors altogether by 
placing the load-shaping burden on the utility. Although this presents a challenge for the utility 
company, conventional wisdom asserts that the more capable of the two parties should bear the 
responsibility. In this case, the utility has the physical and analytical wherewithal to address 
load-balancing issues, whereas the individual renewable electricity producer does not. That being 
said, a tariff may employ a price schedule that reflects trends in daily demand, i.e. paying higher 
tariff prices for electricity generated during hours of peak demand (Couture, Cory, Kreycik, 
Williams, 2010). This somewhat protects the utility companies by incentivizing generators to 
development technology that will increase the load-following ability of renewable electricity. 
Technology Development and Exit Strategy 
Feed-in tariffs offer the flexibility necessary to assist all types of technological 
development. Contracts can be tailored to any type of renewable energy, ensuring the long-term 
development of technologies across the board. This is particularly effective in states and 
countries that have a wide variety of renewable sources available. The pricing mechanism 
necessary to foster growth across technologies can be complex, as the construction and 
productions costs differ greatly among sources. However, source diversity is a valuable portfolio 
characteristic and will only become more so in the future. Therefore, it would be irresponsible to 
allow technological growth to stagnate for any particular source. 
Feed-in tariffs naturally encourage technological development before phasing out 
completely as competitiveness is achieved. This is another outcome of the fixed degression rates 
included in the contracts. As the feed-in tariff degresses, generators have the incentive to 
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increase efficiency (Lesser, Su, 2007). As described in Chapter 2, renewable energy technology 
will begin to benefit from productivity gains stemming from learning-by-doing and economies of 
scale. Degression rates promote these productivity gains while also protecting utilities from 
overpaying for tariffs. The idea is that, in the long run, tariff prices will regress to zero just as 
renewable energy technology becomes competitive with conventional technology. 
Financing and Other Political Advantages 
Ideally, the price of purchasing a cap and trade certificate to offset emissions is equal to 
or greater than the price of the feed-in tariff, causing the utility companies to finance the full cost 
of the tariff. For example, if the price for an emissions certificate is $100 and the cost of 
offsetting the same amount of emissions by employing renewable energy is a certain fraction of 
that, the choice is an easy one. If the costs for these two abatement strategies are equal, the utility 
company may certainly choose to simply purchase certificates out of convenience. Therefore, it 
is imperative that the feed-in tariff is promoted in other ways, such as limiting the use of 
certificates or decreasing the supply of certificates overall, effectively raising the cost of that 
abatement strategy. 
Aside from the economics, which seem advantageous in theory, a feed-in tariff system 
has several key characteristics that make it feasible from a policy perspective. First, a feed-in 
tariff establishes a uniform system across all utilities within a country or state. The tariff is 
mandated by law, demanding that utilities use the same criteria when considering contract 
proposals from independent generators (Butler, Neuhoff, 2008). At the same time, a feed-in tariff 
can be designed with certain flexibilities that protect utilities. For instance, utilities may not be 
obligated to honor all contract proposals. Instead, utilities can work towards their renewable 
capacity goals by selecting the most competitive independent systems. This not only maintains 
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some level of competitiveness for conventional utilities but also encourages renewable electricity 
generators to be as cost-effective as possible. Also, in an ideal world, a feed-in tariff represents a 
budget neutral approach to renewable energy promotion. This is an extremely beneficial 
characteristic from a political standpoint, considering about half of the United States’ population 
prefers that the government stays out of the free market and reduces spending overall. 
Unfortunately, economic and behavioral theory does not necessarily parallel real world 
causes and effects. Ideally, successful feed-in policy would address all of the issues outlined 
above, however the sheer scale and variety of some challenges will make this nearly impossible. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the various characteristics of feed-in tariffs as they exist in 
the real world and compare them to those of other policy options. Many countries around the 
world have deployed feed-in tariffs and we can look at the characteristics of California’s own 
policy, which is in its early stages.  
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Chapter 4: The Feed-In Tariff and Other Policies in the Real World 
 
I. Alternative Renewable Electricity Policies 
AB32 provides the necessary framework and goals necessary for reducing California 
emissions over the coming decades, including the valuation of greenhouse gas emissions and the 
internalization of their associated costs using the cap and trade system. AB32 does not however, 
provide any programs specifically aimed at encouraging renewable energy production. Current 
programs that are designed to encourage greater energy efficiency and the development of 
renewable sources, in addition to the feed-in tariff, include the New Solar Homes Partnership 
(NSHP), the California Solar Initiative (CSI), property tax exclusions, and Property Assessed 
Clean Energy (PACE) financing. Each of these programs is designed to target different projects 
based on size, cost, technology, efficiency, and output. Most programs target the initial cost of 
installing renewable electricity systems, while others target the production of electricity over 
time. Most of these programs are relatively new and still require a great deal of analysis, 
however they certainly represent a step in the right direction for renewable electricity generation 
and lower emissions in the future. 
Most renewable electricity policies target the cost of the initial construction. This is due 
to a large disparity between construction costs and production costs between conventional and 
renewable electricity producers. Traditional electricity sources are characterized by low 
construction costs and relatively high production costs. That is to say, it is fairly cheap to build a 
coal power plant relative to the actual production of electricity. On the other hand, renewable 
sources are characterized by high construction costs and very low generation costs (EWEA, 
2005). If government programs could incentivize small businesses and households to invest in 
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renewable energy systems by assisting with construction costs, the cost-efficiency and general 
deployment of renewable source electricity could increase considerably. 
Programs underneath the California Solar Initiative, including the New Solar Homes 
Partnership and some property tax exclusions, aim to reduce the initial construction cost burden 
experienced by solar self-generation systems. Current PV systems cost approximately $6.75 per 
watt, with the majority of that figure being labor and installation costs. The New Solar Homes 
Partnership provides rebates of $2-2.90/watt depending on the type of project and technology. 
The higher rebates are reserved for projects involving affordable and government housing 
projects, while the lower rebates assist general residential and commercial projects. The NSHP 
also takes into consideration the efficiency of each building type, requiring compliance of 15% 
better and 30% better than current Building Energy Efficiency Standards depending on the rebate 
value (Nasim, Nguyen, 2012).  
One major limitation of the California Solar Initiative is that consumers must be 
customers of one of three investor-owned utilities (IOUs), those being Pacific Gas and Electric, 
Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric. Although these three IOUs service 
the majority of Californians, accounting for approximately 70%, there is still a very large 
population of Californians that are serviced by municipal utilities, leaving them unable to apply 
for CSI rebates. Many municipal utilities offer similar assistance programs, however this lack of 
universal policy may present challenges in the future as utilities change their electricity portfolio 
mixes. 
Similar to the NSHP, California property tax exclusions and PACE financing are in place 
for commercial, industrial, and residential solar systems. Initial owners and owners installing 
new systems can exclude 100% of the system value from their property value, substantially 
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lowering property taxes depending on the size of the system. Also, unlike CSI programs, tax 
exclusions can be claimed by any electricity consumers, not just those serviced by IOUs. For 
those who are looking to build a new PV system, PACE financing provides flexible loan options 
with low interest rates. Local governments offer bonds to investors and then use the capital to 
loan to consumers. Consumers pay back the loan via a slight increase in property taxes over an 
assigned term, with initial investors collecting the interest rate. This loan financing allows 
consumers to diffuse the initial cost of a PV project over many years (typically 15-20), greatly 
improving the economic viability of such projects.  
As construction and installation costs for renewable self-generation systems decline, the 
impact of construction-based subsidy programs such as the California Solar Initiative will also 
become less significant. It is inevitable that PV technology, as well as renewable technology in 
general, will become more affordable in the coming decades. Thus, California must look to 
create policies that aim to encourage the long-term generation of renewably sourced electricity. 
Feed-in tariffs, when designed correctly, provide valuable long-term assistance to generators, 
fostering a responsible transition to renewable electricity.  
 
II. The Feed-In Tariff: Real World Design and Application 
Feed-in tariffs have been employed in the renewable energy sector in countries around 
the world for decades. In the European Union alone, over 15,000MW of photovoltaic electricity 
have been generated between 2000 and 2009 as a result of feed-in tariffs. On a global scale, over 
75% of electricity generated from photovoltaic systems can be attributed to the encouragement 
of feed-in tariffs (Frondel, Ritter, 2010). A feed-in tariff’s most significant advantage is its 
flexibility. Tariffs can be used to target a variety of technologies and can utilize many different 
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pricing strategies, all of which come at little cost to federal or state governments. Feed-in tariffs 
also create several positive externalities in addition to the proliferation of renewable energy 
production including job growth, load balancing, increased exports, and reduced GHG emissions. 
The first feed-in tariff was implemented in Germany in December of 1990. As part of the 
Electricity Feed-in Law, utilities were required to buy electricity from non-utility, renewable 
energy generators. Price per KWh represented a certain premium above the retail electricity price. 
This premium was determined by the cost-of-generation associated with each technology and 
included distinct degression rates based on technological development forecasts for each source 
(Fulton and Capalino, 2012). Germany’s feed-in law also employs an acceptable capacity 
“corridor” to protect against renewable electricity flooding the market and causing significant 
market failures (Fulton, Mellquist, Rickerson, Jacobs, 2011). Denmark and Spain soon followed 
suit and enacted their own feed-in tariff policies, closely modeled after Germany’s. Since then, 
countries around the world, including China and the United States, have enacted their own 
versions of feed-in tariffs, tailoring the policy to fit their renewable energy goals. 
Feed-in tariffs can be tailored to fit almost any scenario by adjusting the eligibility 
standards and pricing methods. First, tariffs can target any type of generation technology, from 
photovoltaic to small hydro and wind systems. This is an important advantage, as it allows 
developers to focus on a wide range of technologies while receiving the same chance to 
experience returns on their investment. This also plays an important role in tariff pricing 
strategies, which will be discussed in detail shortly. Secondly, tariffs may utilize different caps. 
Tariff caps can be based on individual installation capacities, program-wide capacity, total 
program cost, or a combination of all three. Lastly, eligibility can be limited to certain investor or 
owner types depending on the market demographics of the utility area. 
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Pricing is the most flexible aspect of feed-in tariffs and represent the most important 
decision when creating policy. Current feed-in tariffs utilize four distinct pricing strategies: fixed 
price, cost of generation, value to the system, and auction-based. Fixed price tariffs guarantee the 
generator a certain premium above the retail price of electricity. The fixed price strategy is 
constant across technology types. Vice versa, pricing based on the cost of generation is 
determined by the actual cost of the renewable technology (Mendonca, Corre, 2008). This 
pricing scheme results in premiums very similar to fixed prices but allows for more flexibility in 
choosing the type of technology. This is particularly effective in locations that might have two or 
more renewable energy sources. 
Pricing based on value to the system represents the most progressive pricing method. 
Unlike fixed pricing and cost of generation pricing, which concern the paper costs of 
conventional and renewable generation, value to the system takes into account the positive 
externalities associated with renewable electricity production as well as time-of-delivery 
consideration. Prices would reflect the lower emissions of the renewable source as well as 
account for the avoidance of fossil fuels depending on the utility’s portfolio mix. Electricity 
would also be priced according to the time of delivery, providing higher payments for electricity 
generated during times of peak demand. Along with being the most progressive pricing strategy, 
value to the system presents a difficult price degression challenge. On one hand, the tariff should 
be responsive to changing values in the market over the length of the contract. On the other, the 
tariff still needs to provide price and volume certainty to investors entering contracts. This 
dilemma must be addressed. 
Lastly, some feed-in tariffs have adopted an auction-based pricing mechanism. Auctions 
allow utilities to choose tariff applicants based on their estimated cost per KWh generated. After 
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meeting the initial eligibility requirements, generators compete with each other by offering to 
accept the lowest tariff amounts. This allows generators to still realize a profit while minimizing 
cost to the utility company. Auction-based pricing allows for swift reactions to changes in input 
costs faced by renewable electricity generators. For example, if the price of photovoltaic panels 
decreases due to advances in silicon technologies, generators would become more competitive 
and drive down the price of the tariff during the auction. Under a fixed price system, this reaction 
could not occur and utilities would be forced to pay for higher profit margins. 
In addition to the initial pricing strategy, there are also several ancillary design features 
that consider the cost of generation over the length of the contract and adjust the tariff price 
accordingly. Price degression strategies encourage generators to continue to pursue cost saving 
measures over the life of the contract, such as improving technology and efficiency. Tariffs can 
utilize pre-established price degression rates or rates that adjust every year or two depending on 
market characteristics and technological advancement.  
Under the first strategy, considerations may include adjustments for inflation, front-end 
loading, and time of delivery considerations. The first protects the real value of renewable energy 
projects by following the Consumer Price Index. The second offers higher initial tariffs to assist 
in construction financing, followed by lower long-term rates. And lastly, time of delivery pricing 
provides different tariff rates depending on daily and seasonal electricity demand trends. Under 
the second strategy, degression rates may also hinge on changes in the electricity sector over 
time. This degression method introduces some added risk to tariff contracts, as changes in the 
market may diverge from forecasts or investor expectation. Deciding on a pricing strategy is the 
most important part of establishing a feed-in tariff system. 
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III. A Case Study: Feed-in Tariffs in Germany 
Having bought heavily into the Kyoto Protocol, Germany and the rest of the European 
Union have prioritized responsible environmental policy much higher than the United States in 
recent years. Similar to California, Germany has set a renewable energy generation goal of 35% 
of production by 2020. German policymakers have certainly embraced the challenge of reducing 
emissions and improving energy security through a variety of different strategies. Most 
importantly, Germans have taken an environmental approach that works closely with leading 
industries instead of against them, taking care to allow proper time for adaptation before 
tightening standards and increasing regulation. Among other policies, the German feed-in tariff 
system is often lauded as the most progressive in the world. However, economists disagree as to 
whether or not the system, in its current form, truly represents the most cost-effect path to 
renewable energy growth.  
Germany’s initial feed-in tariff was based on a fixed percentage of the retail electricity 
price, later transitioning to a cost-of-generation pricing method. At first, the tariff was based on a 
given premium above the retail rate and was blind to technological differences for renewable 
sources (Ragwitz and Huber, 2005). The policy protected utilities by enacting a cap for fed-in 
renewable electricity at 5% of total generation. However, geographical and technological 
differences soon created pricing and volume issues. Utilities in northern Germany became 
inundated by feed-in tariffs coming from wind turbines located in the area, making them less 
competitive than utilities in the south that experienced fewer tariff applicants. To combat this 
trend, the tariff system was amended to utilize a cost-of-generation pricing strategy with 20-year 
contracts and fixed degression rates. In this system, tariff prices are based on the cost of 
generation of using a specific type of technology. The rate of degression is then calculated based 
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on the empirically derived progress ratios of each technology, subsequently encouraging 
manufacturers to continue to pursue increased efficiency measures and other cost-saving 
developments (Mitchella, Bauknecht, 2006). 
Current tariff prices for photovoltaic generation in Germany range from 21.11 Euro cents 
to 28.74 cents/KWh depending on the size of the system (See Figure 6). The larger the system, 
the smaller the tariff due to the benefits associated with economies of scale. In comparison, tariff 
prices for hydro, onshore wind, and biomass average approximately 6.6 cents/KWh, 7.4 
cents/KWh, and 10.9 cents/KWh, respectively (Fulton and Capalino, 2012). This large price 
difference across technologies exemplifies the cost-of-generation pricing employed by the 
current feed-in system. Degression rates for PV are based on capacity in order to prevent any 
major market failures. If the cost of PV falls and capacity increases dramatically, the tariff 
declines, protecting utilities from having to overpay for fed-in renewable electricity. This in turn, 
protects electricity consumers from experiencing a spike in electricity prices. 
Market Effects 
In theory, Germany’s feed-in policy seems sound, but experts argue whether or not the 
results are significant and therefore cost-effective. Supporters of the feed-in system point to its 
stability, job creation, low transaction costs, and cost-of-generation benefits. From an investment 
perspective, the German feed-in tariff creates a stable environment that minimizes risk and 
volatility. The cost-of-generation strategy nature allows investors to see exactly where the price 
of the tariff is going for each technology over the next 20 years. Future prices are usually a 
significant unknown in investment markets and a large factor in risk. Experts calculate that the 
German feed-in system has led to the creation of 180,000 jobs between 2004 and 2009, bringing 
the renewable energy sector to a total of 340,000. Of these, an estimated 65,000 jobs were 
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created in the PV industry alone (Frondel et al, 2010). Supporters claim that these trends are 
bound to continue, but even the job creation statistics presented here should be taken with a grain 
of salt, as explained below. 
The German feed-in tariff system enjoys other cost-of-generation benefits, including very 
low transaction costs. Transaction costs are inherently low, as the system does not require 
expensive selection methods, preparation procedures, or infrastructural requirements outside of 
the already established power grid. Eligibility requirements are fairly straightforward and the 
contracting process is relatively painless. Some German’s who have successfully entered feed-in 
tariff contracts claim that the entire process, from the first phone call to the actual grid 
connection, took a matter of days. Not only do low transaction costs make the initial transition 
more convenient, they also give investors the opportunity to be in complete control of the 
profitability of the project. Since transaction costs are low and completely transparent, investors 
can focus their efforts on analyzing variable costs on their side. Other benefits from this price 
scheme come in the form of stability on the consumer side. Consumers, like investors, benefit 
from the foresight provided by 20-year contracts.  
Critics of the German feed-in tariff do not deny that the system encourages growth in the 
renewable energy sector; their argument is based on cost efficiency. Opponents point specifically 
to the tariff’s affect on retail prices and job loss in other industries. In late 2011, actual capacity 
of new PV systems taking advantage of the tariff was more than double the projected amount—
approximately 7,400MW versus the predicted 3,500 (Frondel et al, 2010). Although the tariff is 
based on capacity, it does not react quickly enough to significant spikes such as this. This lag 
leads to upward pressure on electricity prices in the short-term as utilities are forced to raise 
prices to cover the cost of paying the tariff. This price increase has been named the EEG 
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surcharge, and represents the difference between the feed-in tariff price and the price of energy 
on the energy exchange. 
With the addition of the EEG surcharge for electricity consumers, retail prices in 
Germany have increased by approximately 20% over the last half decade (See Figure 7). 
However, the increase cannot be solely attributed to the EEG and the feed-in tariff. Economists 
point to two other factors that could be just as, if not more, responsible for the increase in prices. 
First, as part of their environmental campaign, Germany took nearly half (8 of 17) of their 
nuclear power plants offline over the past several years. As recent as 2005, Germany relied on 
nuclear power for over 25% of their electricity needs. Shutting down half of their nuclear plants 
would certainly cause a shift in supply and an upward swing in prices, although no formal 
studies have been conducted. Germany plans to take the remainder of their nuclear plants offline 
by 2022, a transition that could have noticeable price implications. Secondly, over the same five-
year period, German utilities have increased their profit margin from 1.1% to 8.2% (Gille and 
Morris, 2012). This is a massive increase and most certainly had a positive effect on retail prices. 
All things considered, more analysis must be done to conclude the exact source of electricity 
price increases. 
Job creation is also a contested issue between supporters and opponents. Although there 
is no doubt that a boost in renewable energy demand will spark job growth within supporting 
sectors, the question remains as to whether or not job loss in other industries eclipses the positive 
growth. The rising cost of electricity due to the proliferation of renewable energy, whether 
directly impacted by the feed-in tariff or not, significantly raises costs for energy intensive 
industries. In the European Union, where labor and capital are relatively mobile, firms that are 
hit hardest by increasing electricity prices can move to countries with lower energy costs. The 
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alternative to migration is reducing wages to offset the rising costs, another tactic that results in 
lower economic output. Again however, these effects are hard to blame distinctly on the feed-in 
tariff and require further study. In reality, it is probably impossible to identify for certain which 
jobs are created and which jobs are destroyed as a result of a policy as specific as a feed-in tariff. 
Lastly, the effectiveness of renewable energy at reducing emissions is undeniable, yet 
critics of the feed-in approach again cite its costs. The European Union currently utilizes an 
Emissions Trading System, in which Germany participates. This cap and trade system demands 
firms to purchase credits to cover their emissions, creating the incentive for firms to reduce their 
emissions in order to reduce their credit payments. However, efficient technology has outpaced 
the reduction of certificate supply, causing certificate prices to plummeted in Germany and the 
rest of the EU (Faber et al, 2012). Credits bought under the ETS are currently priced at 8 
Euros/ton of greenhouse gases and are expected to continue to decrease if the available credit 
pool is not reduced substantially. In comparison, the abatement cost for a ton of carbon under the 
current feed-in scheme is considerably higher. If one simply took the total cost of the feed-in 
program and divided it by the emissions reductions, the result could be as high as 716	  €/ton 
(Frondel et al, 2009). However, this number is somewhat misleading considering that the costs 
of the feed-in tariff cover a variety of positive externalities, particularly the long-term 
development of renewable technology. 
 
IV. California’s Current Feed-in Tariff Policy 
California is one of only four states in the U.S. that has enacted statewide feed-in tariffs 
in one form or another, joining Hawaii, Vermont, and Maine. Of these four states, California is 
the only one whose tariff is based on time-of-delivery considerations rather than cost-of-
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generation. That is to say, tariff prices for all technology types are based on when the electricity 
enters the grid, providing higher tariff prices for electricity produced during peak hours. 
California’s feed-in tariff utilizes a variety of implementation and pricing strategies, setting it 
apart from the German system analyzed above. 
The California feed-in tariff, like the German system, represents a budget neutral option 
for increasing renewable energy growth. Utility companies are on the hook to pick up the tab for 
two reasons. First, AB32 has enacted strict renewable portfolio standards over the coming years, 
with the first major goal of 33% production by 2020. If utilities companies fail to meet the RPS, 
they may be subject to fines and other penalties. These penalties are typically higher than the 
costs associated with paying a feed-in tariff, so it is in the utilities’ best interest to utilize the 
feed-in tariff system. Similarly, utility companies are also responsible for reducing their 
emissions. By law, utilities may only use emissions certificates to offset 25% of their emissions. 
Therefore, the remainder of emissions reductions must come from producing renewable energy. 
Although the added cost of employing renewable energy will affect prices, the feed-in tariff 
system will not require significant government spending. 
Eligibility for California’s feed-in tariff relies on system capacity and location. The three 
major investor-owned utilities have designated two capacity levels, systems under and over 
3MW9. System owners can choose to enter full-buy or excess contracts (DeShazo, Matulka, 
2010). The first concerns the sale of all energy produced by the system over the course of the 
contract, while the second concerns the sale of surplus energy after then electricity needs of the 
site have been met. Because larger generation systems benefit from economies of scale, the tariff 
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  For comparison, a single-family home can be fully sustained by a 4KW system producing 5,400KWh/year. 
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allotment is generally less. Utilities also value a system based on its location, offering a premium 
for systems located in high demand areas. 
California’s feed-in tariff is also unique, in that it works hand-in-hand with the state’s 
Renewables Portfolio Standards (RPS) program. The state RPS system mandates that investor-
owned utilities must procure 33% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020. The current 
capacity goal is 750 MW of renewable energy capacity and is divided up between the three 
largest IOUs according to the size of their costumer base. Pacific Gas & Electric is responsible 
for 218.8MW, Southern California Edison 226MW, and San Diego Gas & Electric 48.8MW. 
These three utility companies currently average 20.1% production from renewables, up from just 
13.8% in 2003. However, this rate of growth will have to increase in order to meet the 33% goal 
in the next 7 years (Long, 2011). 
California feed-in prices are based on time-of-delivery considerations and are frequently 
amended based on a Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (RE-MAT) or a Renewable Auction 
Mechanism (RAM) depending on the size of the project. Current feed-in tariff prices range from 
8.1¢/KWh to 9.7¢/KWh depending on the length of the contract (10-20 years). These rates are 
considerably less than the tariff prices experienced in Germany. Initially, the California feed-in 
system utilized a Market Price Referent (MPR). The MPR took into account the general 
operating costs associated with a baseload natural gas plant as well as time-of-delivery for fed-in 
renewable electricity. However, California has since moved to the RE-MAT pricing system. The 
RE-MAT makes the same considerations as the MPR, including the time-of-delivery factors, but 
is based on a bidding system.  
The baseline of the RE-MAT is determined by weighting the highest executed contract 
price achieved using the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), which is used to determine 
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tariff pricing for projects over 3MW. These larger renewable energy projects came together in 
late 2011 to bid for financing from the IOUs in the first RAM. In this auction, 13 renewable 
electricity generation projects won contracts totaling 140 MW. The highest accepted proposal 
was $89.23/MWh, or 8.9¢/KWh. Consequently, projects under 3MW start at this price level and 
are then compensated with regard to the electricity’s time-of-delivery, resulting in the price range 
mentioned above. Intuitively, electricity produced during off-peak hours receives a smaller tariff 
than electricity produced during peak hours. If too few generators sign contracts at the initial 
price, the RE-MAT slowly increases the tariff price until prospective renewable projects are able 
to see profitable returns and consequently sign up. 
Degression rates for the California feed-in tariff are based on market forecasts and 
technological growth expectations. Just as any other feed-in tariff, the California degression rates 
are designed to encourage technological advancement and improvement in efficiency. The 
degression rates are fixed for any given contract and are independent of rates used in previous 
contracts. Unlike the German degression rate, which adjusts annually according to activity within 
the renewable energy sector (namely capacity), the California degression rate is predetermined, 
adjusting annually based on forecasts calculated at the time of the initial contract signing. This 
rather inflexible approach provides certainty for both utilities and renewable electricity 
generators, but also may run into problems if initial forecasts are incorrect. If the degression rate 
proves too steep, renewable energy projects could become economically unviable towards the 
end of their contracts. Vice versa, if the degression rate is too flat, the utilities will end up paying 
tariffs that are too high, hurting their competition. 
Market Effects 
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California’s feed-in tariff is in its early stages so market effects will only start to become 
apparent in the coming years. However, comparing the California tariff to its German cousin, we 
can make some assumption for it’s future effects. First, the smaller size of the California tariff 
will likely keep capacity growth modest over the coming years. This more gradual adoption of 
renewable electricity will have less affect on electricity price, barring other effects such as 
economic growth or changes in utility profit margins. One downside is that the slower adoption 
rate will have less immediate effect on the environment. This might pose a challenge with 
concern to the California emissions goals over the coming decades, especially the 2050 goal of 
80% below 1990 standards. 
Secondly, the uniform pricing method used for the California tariff will favor one type of 
technology in the long run. This is not necessarily a bad thing for a couple different reasons. First, 
renewable sources in California are dominated by the potential of solar power. The current 
development rates for solar technology are significantly steeper than development rates 
associated with wind and other technologies. Therefore, it makes sense to invest in programs that 
encourage solar energy, as each dollar spent results in a larger marginal gain in technological 
advancement. Secondly, other renewable technologies are nearing competitiveness. For example, 
tariff prices for large, onshore wind installations in Germany are only a few percentage points 
higher than wholesale electricity prices. It seems that wind, and other technologies that are 
nearing competitiveness, will reach maturity with little assistance. 
Lastly, the California degression rates, although promoting certainty over the life of a 
contract, may spell disaster in the event of a significant shock in the electricity sector. For 
example, if yet another extraction method for fossil fuels is discovered, the subsequent reduction 
in electricity prices will leave the tariff much too high. Utilities would have to pay a much higher 
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percentage to continue to support renewable electricity production, making the feed-in tariff even 
costlier in relative terms. Similarly, if the price of photovoltaic technology drops significantly 
and unexpectedly, the utilities will be stuck paying for high profit margins for renewable 
electricity generators, a far from efficient outcome. 
These predictions should be taken with a grain of salt, as we won’t know the true market 
effects of the tariff until they occur. However, uncertainty should not discourage policymakers 
from determining which characteristics of the feed-in tariff are most valuable and applicable to 
California. The following chapter will delve back into the policy criteria established in Chapter 3. 
Both the German and the Californian feed-in tariff will be evaluated with respect to the criteria 
before recommendations for effective improvements are made. 	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Chapter 5: Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
 
I. Criteria Analysis 
Examining existing policies using consistent criteria is an effective technique in eliciting 
the most significant differences between them. Because criteria are based on theoretical 
framework and revolve around ideal policy characteristics and mechanisms, their application on 
real world policies can reveal the major shortcomings of economic and political theory. This 
section will evaluate the California feed-in tariff with respect to each criterion, while also 
commenting on the benefits or disadvantages of the German tariff. 
Effectiveness 
The California feed-in system, at its root, is effective. Even in it’s early stages, California 
has experienced a growth in renewable energy capacity that can be directly tied to the feed-in 
tariff. That being said, growth has been fairly slow due to relatively low tariff rates and the fairly 
complicated contract process. On one hand, the slow adoption rate can be viewed as responsible. 
Utilities need time to adjust to a changing portfolio mix, especially changes that require such 
vastly different technology. On the other hand, the slow adoption rate is burning valuable time in 
the race against emissions. Germany’s adoption rate under the feed-in tariff was too effective, 
flooding the market and wreaking havoc on retail prices. The appropriate level of effectiveness is 
clearly in between the slower rate of California adoption and the faster German rate. 
Cost Effective 
Cost-effectiveness is difficult to evaluate, as feed-in tariffs result in many positive 
externalities that are difficult to quantify. The largest unknown is the cost of damages associated 
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with greenhouse gas emissions. Assuming higher cost figures, renewable energy promoted 
through the feed-in system can be somewhat cost-effective. One key difference between the two 
tariff policies is that a large portion of Germany’s budget is being spent on encouraging solar 
power, which is not necessarily the county’s most abundant natural resource. In California, solar 
power is clearly the abundant resource and is rightfully receiving the most attention. In the long 
run, this may result in a renewable energy portfolio that is more cost-effective than Germany’s. 
All things considered, it seems that emissions certificates through cap and trade systems 
represent a more cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, we know that 
increasing efficiency alone will not be enough to meet future emissions goals, and that renewable 
technology must be promoted. Therefore, the lower cost-effectiveness of the feed-in tariff might 
be a necessary evil. 
Upfront vs. Long-Term Financial Assistance 
This criterion is more a comparison between the feed-in tariff and current policies that 
target construction costs, such as those underneath the California Solar Initiative. The feed-in 
tariff is a good strategy for promoting medium to large-scale renewable installations. Because the 
feed-in tariff does not provide upfront assistance, aside from a steeper tariff schedule option that 
starts high and decreases quickly, the prospective renewable generator must have the funds 
necessary to cover the initial construction costs. Having the level of liquidity necessary to 
finance construction costs becomes less likely as the size of the installation decreases. Therefore, 
programs such as the New Solar Homes Partnership and Property Assessed Clean Energy 
financing cater much more effectively to small-scale installations that need assistance in the 
short-term, rather than in the long-term. That being said, the feed-in tariff represents a valuable 
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opportunity for larger projects that have the upfront funds but seek long-term returns on their 
investment. 
Mitigation of Risk and Uncertainty 
Mitigating risk is yet another extremely important criterion for a prospective policy. 
Investors consider risk more than anything else when making a decision to enter a market or not. 
If the risk overshadows the possible rate of return on investment, investors will shy away and the 
renewable energy sector will not acquire the capital necessary to boost capacity and develop 
technology. The rate of return under the feed-in tariff system is typically small, ranging from 0-
5% over 20 years, therefore the risk must also be relatively small. 20-year contracts and locked-
in tariff rates do improve certainty in the long run, giving investors the foresight necessary to 
conduct accurate cost-benefit analysis. However, it is the various degression mechanisms that 
add risk over the life of the contract. 
First, the German degression rates are based on capacity, yet do not respond quickly 
enough to significant changes. This adds a significant amount of risk for utility companies. 
Germany has already experienced one spike in renewable capacity that had serious implications 
for the utility companies and the electricity market, raising prices by a significant amount. The 
Californian degression rate is even more inflexible over the course of a given contract. Although 
this provides certainty in the short-term, its inability to respond to market changes in the long-
term could be an issue. The Germans have recently implemented a capacity “corridor,” making 
sure that tariff and degression rates promote increases in capacity within a given band. This 
could represent an effective solution, as long as changes in capacity can be identified quickly and 
the tariff prices adjusted accordingly. 
Market Efficiency 
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The feed-in tariff, like any other government regulation imposed on a market, does create 
some deadweight loss. To put it simply, the natural equilibrium at which the utility companies 
would supply electricity would occur using a generation portfolio of mostly conventional sources, 
as they have provided for decades. Thus, the forced introduction of higher-cost renewable 
electricity by the feed-in tariff inherently decreases both consumer and producer surpluses, at 
least in the short run. In the long run, the feed-in tariff ideally results in the full competitiveness 
of renewable energy, signifying a return to equilibrium in the electricity sector. The main issue is 
that the free market will not adopt renewable electricity fast enough to reach the emissions goals 
set forth by AB32. So from an environmental perspective, particularly one that is savvy to the 
economic and social costs of greenhouse gas emissions, the feed-in tariff is efficient. 
In terms of transaction costs, which decrease efficiency of a program, the German and 
Californian tariffs could not be more different. In Germany, information regarding eligibility and 
contract processes is readily available and easy to understand. There are very few overhead costs 
in the form of administrative or regulatory fees that inherently make the adoption process easy 
and effective. In California however, information regarding the feed-in tariff and its various 
eligibility requirements are very difficult to come by, and even harder to understand once 
procured. This is a major detractor for possible investors who value time and convenience in 
their decision-making. The transaction costs also get worse as the size of the renewable 
installation increases, as permitting issues increase and legal council becomes almost a necessity. 
By comparison, the efficiency of rebate programs such as the NSHP seems to be much 
better than the feed-in tariff. However, this is perhaps an unfair comparison due to the relatively 
small-scale of installations that take advantage of these upfront programs. Installations of this 
sort are usually built on rooftops and other existing structures where construction is already 
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permitted and access to necessary electrical infrastructure is good. Larger installations will 
always have to jump through more regulatory hoops than smaller projects, but the California 
system has a thing to learn from its streamlined German cousin. 
Transparency 
This criterion sees yet another significant difference between the German and Californian 
feed-in tariffs. The German system, having far fewer administrative and regulatory issues, is 
simpler, naturally causing it to be more transparent. The Californian feed-in tariff feels much 
more bureaucratic, leaving prospective investors to sift through information on both government 
websites and investor-owned utility websites. Transparency does not increase the monetary cost-
effectiveness, but it certainly caters to the individual’s preference of convenience, which has 
serious implications for actual adoption. This phenomenon will be addressed in more detail in 
the behavioral section below. 
Market Conformity  
We can see from the German system that the feed-in tariff does lead to market 
conformity in the long run. Although PV technology is still highly subsidized through the tariff, 
wind, hydro, and biomass are all approaching competitiveness in the greater electricity market. 
Wind in particular has experienced great increases in competitiveness due to the feed-in tariff, 
this is even more important considering its abundance throughout Germany. That being said, the 
German tariff has been active for nearly two decades, alluding to a conformity process that is 
slow and not without its challenges. Judging from the German experience, California is at least 
two, if not three, decades away from making renewable electricity a fully competitive and mature 
market. In the scheme of things, this transition is not all that slow, especially when being 
compared to the length of transition that would occur without government regulation. 
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Technological Advancement 
Both the German and Californian feed-in tariff designs effectively promote the 
advancement of renewable electricity technology. However, there are some key differences. The 
German pricing scheme is based on cost-of-generation, providing equal support to all types of 
technology with respect to their unique construction and operating costs. This across-the-board 
assistance promotes advancement in all technologies rather than focusing on the source that 
might have the most potential. This is where the Californian feed-in tariff might be at an 
advantage. The Californian system promotes more efficient technological advancement through 
specialization. Since solar energy has the most potential, California’s value-to-the-system pricing 
strongly encourages the advancement of solar technology. Also, remembering the advantages of 
distributed versus utility-scale renewable installations, the advancement of flexible, rooftop solar 
technology bodes well for its competitiveness in the future. Specializing on advancing 
technologies that concern California’s most abundant renewable source, while other states and 
countries perfect the technologies associated with their abundant renewable sources, seems like 
the most efficient way to get to worldwide renewable electricity competitiveness. 
Technological advancement underneath the feed-in tariff, regardless of what source it 
targets, is far superior to technological advancement under upfront rebate programs. Rebate 
programs that assist small-scale installations hardly promote advancement at all, mostly because 
household systems are generally a one-time investment and are primarily used to offset onsite 
electricity needs. The incentive to increase efficiency or improve technology is simply not there, 
as profit margins for small installations are slim to none. Small-scale generators also lack the 
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financial and physical capabilities necessary to improve technology. In this regard, the feed-in 
tariff is highly advantageous. 
 
II. Behavioral Factors and Social Norms 
Behavioral factors are by far the most overlooked issue in terms of environmental policy 
design. Current environmental programs here in California, whether targeting emissions 
reductions or promoting renewable electricity, do not properly address green consumer 
preferences or environmental social norms. Over the past decade or so, the environmental 
movement has gained significant ground, yet access to good information and marketing of green 
products still remains weak. The principles of the feed-in tariff are economically sound, but they 
fail to capture even the greenest of consumers due to the prevalence of negative and incorrect 
perceptions concerning reliability, convenience, and price. The feed-in tariff, as well as all the 
other renewable electricity programs, should be accompanied by aggressive marketing 
campaigns that target all consumer demographics and stress the importance and relatively easy 
process of adopting renewable electricity. 
The two most widely held negative stereotypes concerning renewable electricity are that 
it is more expensive and less reliable than conventional technology and that it is inconvenient to 
adopt. Current policies, especially the feed-in tariff, do very little to combat these perceptions 
and even bolster certain aspects of them. First, the average consumer does not understand the 
economics behind subsidies and tariffs; they simply know that renewable technologies are more 
expensive than conventional technology. Marketing campaigns do not necessarily have to 
convey the inner-workings of a subsidy, but they should stress the bottom line, which is what the 
majority of consumers use to make a purchasing decision. Using the feed-in tariff, generators 
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receive ample compensation for producing renewable electricity, and in most cases even 
experience a positive return on their investment. Therefore, the positive bottom line should be 
enough for a good percentage of prospective adopters. For those consumers who do want to do 
their own research, access to good information needs to be available. Although the feed-in tariff 
is in its early stages, more studies need to be conducted and the causes and effects must be 
explicitly presented. There are plenty of academic studies that concern feed-in tariffs around the 
world, as evidenced by this paper, but interested consumers will be much more persuaded by 
literature that focuses on possible causes and effects in their own backyard10.  
Similarly, framing of the policy does not have to include why renewable electricity is just 
as reliable as conventional energy, only that it is. After all, those who adopt renewable energy 
using the feed-in tariff are still connected to the same grid and continue to receive the same 
energy they did in the past. It is facts like these that need to be highlighted for consumers in 
order to build appeal and encourage adoption. In terms of convenience, the current California 
feed-in tariff shoots itself in the foot. Consumers perceive the transition as inconvenient because 
the transition using the feed-in tariff is inconvenient. However, this is more an issue of the actual 
mechanics of the policy, rather than an issue of behavioral factors. 
Although many consumers hold the same negative perceptions towards renewable 
electricity, the ways in which these perceptions can be altered differ greatly between various 
consumer groups. Therefore, it is imperative that policies concerning renewable electricity 
properly target different demographics in order to gain the mass appeal necessary to truly 
encourage adoption. Targeting demographics is particularly important in a state like California, 
where the consumer base is extremely diverse. Electricity consumers represent every race, socio-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This is a result of familiarity bias, or rather the tendency for individuals to have higher confidence levels in decisions that involve issues they 
are familiar with. This familiarity can be a result of locational proximity to the issue as well as similarities in occupational knowledge or interests. 
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economic class, cultural background, and occupational sector. One of the most damaging 
stereotypes of the environmental movement is that it is for wealthy, Caucasian males. Marketing 
for renewable electricity adoption must break down this stereotype by highlighting the 
accessibility of programs to everyone. 
The feed-in tariff certainly faces a unique set of challenges in terms of breaking down 
perceptions and increasing appeal, mostly due to the type of generators that it targets. This paper 
concluded that the feed-in tariff is most effective for medium and large-scale operations, i.e. 
businesses and larger cooperatives rather than individual households. Although many of the 
behavioral factors are framed in terms of individual consumers, a lot of them apply to businesses 
as well. Like individuals, businesses are part of a much larger business community that 
establishes and practices its own set of social norms. A policy will be successful if it can instill a 
sense of environmental responsibility at this larger scale. 
Environmental policies can positively frame renewable electricity and instill a sense of 
environmental responsibility within business communities in two ways. First, the feed-in tariff 
can be framed directly to the business community as the fiscally responsible thing to do. Unlike 
the average individual, businesses are more likely to employ quantitative methods during the 
decision-making process. Therefore, stressing the higher future cost of conventional electricity 
can encourage a switch to renewable electricity now. Also, businesses generally consider longer 
investment timelines than individuals do. So framing the feed-in tariff as a steady form of long-
term revenue will certainly be appealing to most businesses that are concerned with fiscal 
stability over the long run.  
Second, marketing of the policy can influence businesses indirectly by encouraging the 
customers of businesses to demand greener business practices. This strategy has the chance to be 
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extremely effective. As addressed earlier, many consumers state that they are willing to pay a 
premium for green products. However, when actually presented with the opportunity to go green, 
they fail to adopt the product, often citing inconvenience as the deciding factor. In this case 
however, the consumer does not bear the inconvenience of adopting renewable electricity. Even 
if a business must raise its prices to cover the cost of going green, consumers that previously 
stated they were willing to pay a green premium but didn’t will now be much more likely to 
make the switch, simply because the inconvenience factor is no longer there. 
While marketing for the feed-in tariff focuses on various business communities and their 
customer bases, marketing for smaller-installation programs needs to focus on demographics of 
the individual consumer. Programs such as the NSHP need to be framed as convenient, as the 
participants will always be the ones that bear the transaction and opportunity costs associated 
with the adoption process. Highlighting positive characteristics such as transparency and low 
overhead costs certainly improve the perception of convenience. These programs also need to be 
framed as accessible to all consumers, regardless of socio-economic status. The major point of 
these programs is to assist consumers with the initial construction costs regardless of their 
financial status. This should be at the forefront of any marketing campaign.  
Policies concerning renewable electricity can be framed in ways that appeal to a wide 
variety of possible adopters. These frames can be actual differences in the policy’s mechanisms 
or simply rhetorical frames that appeal to different consumer behaviors. Just like marketing 
campaigns for any competitive consumer product, renewable energy policy can seek to capture 
the interest of people of different economic classes, ethnic groups, and cultural backgrounds. 
This is not to insinuate any bending of facts, but rather the selection of different policy aspects to 
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sell to different audiences. The population of California is diverse; therefore the methods to 
attract renewable energy adopters must be as such. 
Current advertisement for the feed-in tariff and other renewable electricity programs is 
weak to nonexistent. Policies must consider the above behavioral factors and associated 
marketing strategies and pursue them aggressively. At the same time, the claims made in framing 
the programs must be true. This means improvements must be made to the adoption processes of 
programs, especially for the feed-in tariff. Improvements should be aimed specifically at 
reducing transaction costs and inconvenience in order to create a more streamlined process for 
the adopter.   
 
III. Recommendations for California 
In addition to improving consumer awareness of renewable electricity programs, 
California should make some minor changes to the actual mechanisms of the feed-in tariff. First, 
renewable energy capacity underneath the feed-in tariff should be increased, while at the same 
time ensuring that over-adoption does not occur. Secondly, the feed-in tariff should cooperate 
more closely with the California emissions cap and trade system, so as to improve market 
efficiency and ensure the internalization of negative environmental externalities. Lastly, 
California must streamline the adoption process by increasing transparency and reducing 
transaction costs. 
The current adoption rate in California under the feed-in tariff is too slow, leading to a 
renewable energy capacity increase that will struggle to meet the 2020 RPS goal. In order to 
increase capacity, tariff rates should be slightly increased. The current tariff price in California is 
less than 1/3rd the PV tariff price offered in Germany. Raising the tariff by just a few cents 
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should have a positive effect on capacity that is larger than the negative effect on consumers in 
the form of higher retail prices. This should of course be the focus of intense economic analysis, 
but judging by Germany’s success using much higher rates, a slight increase in California tariff 
rates should not cause significant market effects. In conjunction with raising rates, California 
should also adopt a capacity “corridor” similar to Germany’s in order to prevent over-adoption. 
As mentioned throughout this paper, the lack of distinct pricing of greenhouse gas 
emissions causes internalization of the associated environmental and social costs to be 
incomplete. As in Europe, certificate prices in the cap and trade system have proven to be 
unexpectedly low. This does not point to the failure of the system, but rather to the fact that 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions has been cheaper than expected. Therefore, reduction 
expectations under the cap and trade system should be drastically increased to better mirror the 
true damages caused by emissions. Firms will continue to pay for certificates until it is cheaper 
to employ other emissions reduction strategies, i.e. switching to renewable electricity. These 
larger firms represent ideal candidates for installing renewable electricity technology using the 
feed-in tariff. 
One of the largest issues associated with the current feed-in tariff system is that it is 
confusing. Finding information on eligibility standards and contract procedures is nearly 
impossible and extremely time consuming. On top of that, the actual contract process requires a 
great deal of paperwork and does not result in a grid connection or tariff payments until months 
later. Making the process more user-friendly would reduce administrative costs and get contracts 
on the grid more quickly, while also making the feed-in more appealing to other prospective 
adopters. In addition, better communication between the government and the investor-owned 
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utilities would improve the responsiveness of tariff prices for new contracts, once again ensuring 
that the renewable energy capacity does not increase too quickly. 
It should be noted that these recommendations are mostly based on comparisons to the 
German feed-in tariff experience. Although the two feed-in tariffs are somewhat similar, the 
market responses could be vastly different due to differences in renewable source availability, 
electricity market infrastructure, consumer preferences, etc. It should also be noted that the 
California feed-in tariff is still in its early stages. All these considerations point to the fact that 
further studies need to be conducted, and that in the meantime, the policy should be given a 
chance as it stands. However, if renewable electricity does begin to fall behind its expected 
capacity goals, these policy recommendations may very well be the correct responses. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The feed-in tariff is a flexible, yet effective mechanism in promoting the proliferation of 
renewable electricity in California. The tariff creates a stable investment environment that 
protects both the utilities and the renewable electricity generators. Not only does the system 
foster capacity growth, but also technological advancement to the point where renewable 
electricity can compete in the market without assistance. From an environmental standpoint, the 
feed-in tariff contributes significantly towards achieving the emissions reduction goals set forth 
by AB32 without causing harmful increases to electricity prices. 
The feed-in tariff model has been used in countries all over the world and in countless 
variations. The California model is certainly unique, using a dynamic combination of eligibility 
requirements, pricing mechanisms, and degression rates. Flaws can already be spotted in the 
system, but it is too early to tell what type of market effects will truly prevail. The key will be to 
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analyze the market effects as they happen and adjust the tariff accordingly. In the meantime, it 
would be advantageous to pursue more aggressive green marketing campaigns in order to 
establish meaningful social norms in favor of environmentally responsible goods and practices. 
These strong social norms will help to ensure quicker and more effective transitions to green 
products in the future, including the complete transition to renewable electricity over the coming 
generations. 
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Figure	  3:	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  (Long,	  2011)	  
Figure	  4:	  Total	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  of	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  Production	  per	  KWh	  (Frondel	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Figure	  5:	  Cost	  Curves	  by	  Renewable	  Technology	  (Think	  Progress,	  2011)	  	  http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/05/26/208184/ge-­‐solar-­‐cheaper-­‐than-­‐fossil-­‐fuels-­‐in-­‐5-­‐years/	  
Figure	  6:	  German	  Feed-­‐In	  Tariff	  Prices	  and	  Capacity	  Gains	  (Fulton	  and	  Capalino,	  2012)	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Figure	  7:	  German	  Electricity	  Prices	  as	  a	  %	  of	  2005	  Prices	  (Clean	  Technica,	  2012).	  http://cleantechnica.com/2012/09/03/german-­‐electricity-­‐prices-­‐rise-­‐as-­‐utilities-­‐increase-­‐their-­‐profit-­‐margin-­‐from-­‐1-­‐1-­‐to-­‐8-­‐2/	  	  *Note:	  The	  three	  gradual	  lines	  represent	  the	  retail	  prices	  in	  the	  Residential,	  Commercial,	  and	  Industrial	  sectors.	  The	  more	  volatile	  line	  is	  the	  wholesale	  price	  of	  electricity	  as	  paid	  on	  the	  Electricity	  Exchange.	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